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1 About this appendix 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate has commissioned Ecorys and its partners to 
investigate possibilities to realise the gains from data usage. The central question is: what is the 
role of data in the technology sector and what are the opportunities and risks of data sharing? The 
report explores this question in order to obtain insight into effective policy options that can help to 
speed up data sharing to the benefit of society and the economy. This document is a (separate) 
appendix to that report. 
 
The analysis in the main report draws from five complementary case studies, on (i) online search, 
(ii) social networks, (iii) banking, (iv) business software, and (v) vertical exclusion. The last one 
does not zero in on a specific market or sector but is a topical case.  
 
Chapter 1 in the main report describes the research methodology, including the approach to 
explore the cases. Note that in the case discussions that follow, we include observations from 









2 Questions in semi-structured interviews 
Part of the approach to explore the cases was to carry out semi-structured interviews, in which we 
started with similar questions, to be followed up by case-specific discussions. The common 
questions were the following: 
 
1. Which types of data do you use (which typology do you use in relationship to your business 
model, for instance when collecting, processing and storing different types of data)? 
2. Which types of functionalities / services do you offer in connection to these types of data? 
3. For each of these data types, how do you learn from them, and how does data-enabled 
learning translate into your value proposition to your customers? 
4. Does the added value of extra data to improve your offerings eventually reduce (and if so, how 
fast), or is having more data always valuable? When and why? Does this differ between data 
types? 
5. How important is (near) real-time data for your business model? 
6. Where and how do you obtain these data types? Please describe to what extent you enter into 
agreements with data collectors, and in case of such agreements, what types of conditions 
typically apply. Which types of data are typically not included in data-sharing agreements and 
why? 
7. To what extent are the data types you use proprietary and unique, that is, to what extent can it 
be obtained elsewhere, easily imitated, or reverse-engineered by competitors?  
8. How hard is it for others to copy your functionalities or services without having access to the 
data that you use? 
9. Which types of mandatory data access (at reasonable/viable tariffs) could have positive effects 
on competition and innovation? 

















3 Case: online search 
3.1 Case description 
Search engines (such as Bing and Google search) try to match information seekers with 
information available on the Internet. In order to do so, these companies invest in indexing (the 
content on) websites and in developing algorithms for interpreting search queries entered by 
information seekers and matching these interpretations with entries in the index.  
 
The development of search algorithms is a process which learns from past results. This would give 
rise to a first-mover advantage and contribute to a risk of tipping the market. However, the learning 
effect is not the only driver of growth which may explain market shares. Other drivers may be 
network effects1, scope economies, innovative merrits and (possibly) anti-competitive behaviour.  
 
The search market is highly concentrated with Google serving around 90% of the market. A 
hypothesis is that, in the absence of data sharing, rivals are not able to catch up with Google. If this 
hypothesis is confirmed, a central question is whether mandatory data sharing can facilitate entry 
and restore competition. In addition, what does this mean for privacy and innovation incentives? 
  
 
3.2 Preliminary analysis 
Internet Search Building Blocks 




Sources and data 
When using a search engine, one is not searching the Internet itself, but an index or library of 
webpages stored by a search company like Google or Microsoft. These indexes are created by 
web crawlers, which are automated processes that record content of webpages and follows links 
from those webpages to other webpages to record their content. While websites change on a daily 
basis, web crawling never stops. All the information which is gathered through web crawling is then 
processed into an index like an index at the end of a book, with an entry for every word on every 
webpage that is indexed. Besides websites, an index may also include other information, such as 
                                                          







information about locations, videos, books, pictures, art, buildings, public transport schedules, and 
programmes from sport leagues.2 Note that search queries may signal crawlers to start indexing 
particular content because the users appear to gain interest in that content. 
 
An algorithm goes through the index to link websites to search queries. It needs to interpret the 
search query in relation to the information in the index. This involves language analysis (like 
interpreting spelling mistakes and homonyms3), analysis of backlinks (how many other websites 
refer to a website in relation to a search query), analysis of comparable search queries by other 
users in the past and their subsequent clicking behaviour4,5,6.  Search queries and clicking 
behaviour is either provided by the end-user when using a search engine or it is observed by 
cookies or the web browser (EC-Council, 2016, p. 87). Note that clicking behaviour is behavioural 
data which results from interaction with the search engine’s user interface and feeds back into the 
algortihm. This feedback loop results in learning effects. 
 
Next to search queries, algorithms also incorporate contextual information (such as location, 
device used, et cetera) to better interpret search queries.7 For example, the algorithm may 
differentiate between search queries entered on mobile devices and those entered on desktop 
devices or between people’s modalities8. This type of information is typically observed by logging 
IP-addresses, tracking locations, finger printing, cookies, et cetera. Sometimes, personal 
information like recent search activities9 may serve as contextual information. However, the other 
personal information (age, gender, nationality, occupation, or hobbies) feed into profile data which 
generally does not feed into the search algorithm to maintain objectiveness of organic search 
results. Profile data does (along with the other data) feed into the algorithm that matches advertised 
search results to be displayed among the organic search results (often with a disclaimer). Personal 
information may be provided by the individual when subscribing to an account, but it may also be 
observed or derived from data obtained through cookies or browser.10 
 
The process of developing the search algorithm 
The previous discussion shows that internet search is data intensive. The volume of data is growing 
with the volumes of websites and internet users, as well as the number of explanatory variables 
entering the equation. This makes the problem which the algorithms must solve more complex. In 
order to solve those problems, technologies are employed such as data mining, machine learning 
and data fusion (Kathuria, 2019). Without going into the details of the difference between these 
technologies, the basic idea is that data are merged and combined at a large scale which allows for 
obtaining more consistent and accurate information than the original raw data and for finding new 
correlations that would otherwise not have been identified. For example, Google’s RankBrain is an 
AI technology that interprets what people are looking for based on their (often) incomplete, 
inaccurate and misspelled search queries. This algorithm learns from behavioural data (such as 
search queries and clicking behaviour) as well as contextual data (mother tongue of an individual, 
recurring spelling mistakes, past search queries, locations, device used, et cetera). 
 
                                                          
2  https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/crawling-indexing/  
3  such as I left my phone on the left side of the room 
4  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-26/google-turning-its-lucrative-web-search-over-to-ai-machines 
5  https://backlinko.com/google-rankbrain-seo 
6  Clicking behaviour includes (amongst others) click-through-rates (how many times has a person with similar search 
query clicked on a particular website), dwell time (how much time users spend on a website once they click it) and pogo 
sticking (the degree to which users keep going back and forth till they find what they look for). See 
https://onlineidealab.com/google-rankbrain-what-is-it-how-can-you-benefit-from-it/ 
7  Case AT. 40099 (Google Android) 
8  such as whether they are walking, driving in public transport, or driving in a car. 
9  https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/  








In addition, the algorithms require creativity from engineers11, sandbox testing12, lab-panel testing 
by (over thousands of) ‘search quality raters’13, and live traffic experiments using a small fraction 
(0.1% according to Google) of the users14. Note that the development of a search service is 
language dependent. In other words, many of the investments in innovation and testing need to be 
duplicated for every new language in which the search service is provided. 
 
 
3.3 Analysis of research questions 
3.3.1 What role does data play in the business model? 
Data is a key input (next to other inputs and innovative activities) for generating relevant search 
results and for improving the quality of these search results. 
 
Indexes 
As is clear from the previous, the Index is an essential data base for search providers. Interview 
partners indicated that there are four indexes with sufficient scale and quality to provide meaningful 
search results (those of Google, Bing, Yandex, and Baidu). In addition, there are open-source 
crawlers such as Common Crawl15, providing free access to copies of significant parts of the web. 
Although this index is much smaller in size16, this does not say much about the quality of the index. 
One of our interview partners indicated that indexing the most relevant or useful webpages quickly 
leads to a better outcome than trying to index as many webpages as possible.  
 
‘Optimising’ a web index is a matter of technical analysis, insights, and judgment calls. However, 
there are also feedbacks from search queries to the web crawling process: people reveal interests 
by entering search queries, these revelations instruct crawlers to target these interests in the 
indexing process. For example, in case of an unexpected event of global relevance (say a 
meltdown of a nuclear power plant in Fukushima), news items about this event are popping up all 
over the internet. These news items need to be indexed quickly. The crawlers must immediately go 
to work and target relevant news items. The fact that people suddenly start searching for specific 
terms triggers crawlers to get moving and to target keywords like "nuclear power plant", "meltdown" 
and "Fukushima".  
 
Data as input for training algorithms 
Algorithms interpret search queries and look for the most relevant websites to provide answers to 
the questions of searchers. These algorithms are developed using a combination of human 
creativity and machine learning, followed by lab-experiments using panels and subsequent live 
traffic experiments in the form of A/B testing involving a small fraction of users17.  
 
Much of the literature on search engines focusses on data as an input for machine learning, i.e. 
training algorithms.18 The notion in these papers is that algorithms learn from analysing correlations 
between search queries and clicking behaviour. The more search queries that can be analysed, the 
more significant these correlations become, the faster the search algorithm learns, the higher click-
                                                          
11  See https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/mission/users/ 
12  https://searchengineland.com/google-to-deliver-caffeine-after-holidays-29479 
13  https://www.intermediair.nl/innovatie/algoritmes/google-laat-grootste-ai-machine-ter-wereld-door-mensen-factchecken 
14  See https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/mission/users/ 
15  https://commoncrawl.org/ 
16  WebCrawler has around 2.6 billion websites indexed, while Google had indexed 130 trillion websites in 2016 (up from 30 
trillion in 2013). See http://commoncrawl.org/connect/blog/ and https://searchengineland.com/googles-search-indexes-hits-
130-trillion-pages-documents-263378 
17  See https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/mission/users/ 








through-rates and dwell time, and the less likely will people engage in pogo sticking19. Higher click-
through-rates and dwell time (and a lower degree of pogo sticking) implies that the user perceives a 
higher quality of the search engine, which attracts more users, which increases the volume of 
search queries. This learning effect has also been described as an indirect network effect between 
past and current users (Argenton & Prüfer, 2012), and as ‘data feedback loop’ (OECD, 2016).  
 
The previous indicates that the learning effect may create a first-mover advantage for search 
engines with a large market share. Based on this, Microsoft argued in the Microsoft-Yahoo! Merger 
case (2010) that it lacked the necessary scale. The company claimed that “increased scale will 
impact on the user experience, because the trailing volume of search queries holds each party back 
from improving their search results”.20 Various authors (including Google’s chief economist Hal 
Varian and Amazon’s Pat Bajari) have downplayed this statement by pointing out that the strength 
of the learning effect diminishes with scale (Anderson, 2020)21. Indeed, He et al. (2017) find that 
that the learning curve of a search algorithm flattens out at low volumes of search queries (see 
figure below). Moreover, it has been argued that the first-mover advantage expires rather quickly 
because the shelf-life of data is limited (that is: the value of past search queries to generate 
relevant search results expires quickly)22.   
 
 
Figure 3-1 Relation between CTR and historical search queries 
 
Source (He, et al., 2017) 
 
 
In relation the Microsoft/Yahoo merger, both the European Commission as well as the U.S. 
Department of Justice recognised that Google’s competitors indeed had (or could realise) the 
necessary minimum efficient scale for a majority of (popular) search queries. However, Microsoft 
claimed that there is a long tail of specific and rare queries (which make up 20%-25% of all queries) 
with volumes at which the algorithm will still be learning fast. The US Department of Justice (2010) 
concluded that this fact reinforces scale economies (and hence a first mover advantage) because a 
query is more likely to be unique when the number of users of a search engine is small23. 
Moreover, it has been argued that rare and unclear queries are interpreted by linking historical 
examples of related queries and leverage historical examples that differ in minor ways from the 
                                                          
19  Click-through-rates refers to how many times has a person with similar search queries clicked on a particular website, 
dwell time means the time users spend on a website once they click it, and pogo sticking is the degree to which users 
keep going back and forth till they find what they look for. 
20  Case No COMP/M.5727 - MICROSOFT/ YAHOO! SEARCH BUSINESS, para 162 
21  This is not surprising as general statistics teaches us that relevance (R2) increases with the sample size (n) at a 
diminishing rate; at a certain point, the sample is large enough for getting significant results and an increase in sample size 
does not lead to higher relevance. 
22  The Internet is constantly updated with new information and content, making the concept of ‘relevance’ a moving target. As 
such, search algorithms are constantly updated with new combinations of queries and click-through-rates. This implies that 
the shelf-life of data (and thus any first-mover advantage) is limited. 








target query (He, et al., 2017).24 25 This technology has the effect of expanding the shelf-life of 
historical search queries, which reinforces the first-mover advantage. Moreover, in relation to the 
feedback from search queries to the process of indexing (see above), the fact that data expires 
quickly enhances the first mover advantage (in terms of number of users) rather than mitigating it26. 
Furthermore, the introduction of technologies such as data mining, machine learning and data 
fusion propels the number of explanatory variables entering the search algorithm. These 
technologies allow for solving increasingly more challenging problems, but in order to do that, they 
require more data (Anderson, 2020)27. 
 
The previous observations point to data feedback loops and scale effects in the learning process of 
algorithms. While a vast stream of literature confirms this, little research has been done on the 
relative importance of this effect (compared to other factors) for the overall quality of search results 
and the competitive position of a search provider. As explained, machine learning is only one 
element of developing search algorithms. It also involves the creativity of engineers and a lot of 
testing. Moreover, there are other quality features, such as loading time28, that require investments. 
 
3.3.2 Which data are necessary?  
To operate as a search engine, one needs a web index. To deliver high quality search results, one 
needs search query logs and data on clicking behaviour associated with search queries. 
Correlating these data results in more relevant search results, which in turn attracts more users and 
thus more data. Moreover, search queries inform web crawlers on when and how to update the 
index. The resulting learning effects are important for the development of search engine 
technology, along with other innovative activities. It is not clear if and how fast these feedback loops 
flatten out, that is, whether there is a minimum efficient scale of data and how difficult it is for others 
to realise this minimum efficient scale.  
 
In this learning process, access to information on how the search results have been presented to 
the searcher is a "nice-to-have" because it allows for better interpretation of correlations between 
search queries and clicking behaviour. As such, contextual information on whether the results have 
been displayed on a desktop computer or a mobile device may help to interpret search queries. 
Furthermore, there is a causal relation between search results and clicking behaviour, which means 
that search results may be inferred from clicking behaviour and thereby may create technical 
opportunities for reversed engineering of search algorithms. 
 
Some search providers service a market niche. For example, Startpage and DuckDuckGo target 
privacy-sensitive customers. The small scale of these niches prevents these companies from 
developing their own index or algorithm. The business model of these search providers depends on 
‘reselling’ the search results of another search engine. Startpage relies on Google results only29. 
                                                          
24  He at al (2017) find that  “historical examples of related queries can be linked to seemingly rare queries by applying 
clusters and graph cutting techniques to the query-document bipartite graph his graph can be used to generate related 
queries and leverage historical examples that differ in minor ways from the target query.” 
25  Google has developed a machine learning technology called RankBrain which helps in this process. See 
https://onlineidealab.com/google-rankbrain-what-is-it-how-can-you-benefit-from-it/ 
26  Consider the example of the nuclear power plant mentioned above. The crawlers of the search engine with a large global 
customer base receive earlier and stronger signals to start updating the index with relevant new items about this event 
(compared to the search engine with only a relatively small and geographically concentrated customer base). 
27  From general statistics we that, as the number of explanatory variables (e.g. location, device, sex, or age) goes up, the 
degrees of freedom go down and the volume of observations (or the number of users of the search engine) must increase 
if we still want to find relevant and significant correlations. 
28  During the interviews, respondents (other than Google) stated that ‘loading time’ is an important quality feature in the 
perception of end-users. Google happens to outperform others https://www.shoutmeloud.com/google-started-ranking-
websites-based-on-load-time-and-speed.html 








DuckDuckGo says it operates as a so-called meta search engine, combining the search results of 
multiple search sources, though it mostly displays the results from Bing30.  
 
For the purpose of operating a search engine, some contextual (personal) information may be 
important (such as location, device used, previous search queries and clicking behaviour of the 
searcher). Other personal information is a nice to have, rather than an essential input (see textbox 
below). 
 
Role of personal information in search services 
Views differ on the value of personal data for search services. Some search engines (such as 
DuckDuckGo and Startpage) advertise that they do not personalise search results and advertisements and 
thereby preserve people’s privacy and refrain from creating a ‘filter bubble’. From interviews it became 
clear that the strategy of preserving privacy goes at the expense of advertisement revenues, because the 
click-through-rates of non-personalised advertisements are lower. Google also indicates that (besides 
contextual information such as a persons’ location, past search queries, or the device used) it refrains from 
further personalising organic search results31. It does personalise advertisements, including advertised 
search results. Notwithstanding that some users and search queries benefit from personalised search 
results, ranking search results relative to personal profiles is not an essential quality feature. In fact, 
personalising organic search results may not be regarded a quality feature at all (on the contrary).  
 
Access to personal profiles may be helpful but not essential for search engines that run an advertisement-
based revenue model. Without personalisation, advertisements are sold by auctioning ‘search queries’. 
When a searcher enters a query, he or she reveals an instant interest which can be matched with an 
appropriate advertisement without knowing personal information of the searcher. All in all, it seems that for 
the purpose of operating a search engine, access to personal information is a nice-to-have, rather than an 
essential input.  
 
3.3.3 Can access to necessary data facilitate entry or strengthen competition? 
Data is not the only entry barrier  
One reason for the high concentration of the search market is the presence of entry barriers 
resulting from the need for high upfront and recurring investments that are largely sunk, including: 
“investments in hardware, cost of indexing the web, human capital, cost of developing and updating 
the algorithm and IP patents”.32 In 2010, Microsoft claimed in the Microsoft/Yahoo merger case that 
entry into the market would require an investment of over USD 2 billion in hardware and human 
capital and several billions of investments in developing and updating the algorithm33. On top of 
that, a new entrant would have to bear “significant costs related to the necessity to have a large 
database”34. Such investments require deep pockets and the ability to realise sufficient scale. The 
former prevents candidates from entering the market as a new fully integrated search provider and 
the latter prevents already entered resellers targeting a specific niche (like Startpage or 
DuckDuckGo) from climbing the ladder of investment35.  
 
Furthermore, an advertisement-based business model may create another first-mover advantage. 
This is because such a business model is characterised by indirect network effects which, through 
investments, become circular. First, a growing number of searchers attracts a growing number of 
advertisers and growing advertisement revenues. The growing number of advertisers itself does not 
                                                          
30  https://help.duckduckgo.com/results/sources/?redir=1 
31  https://searchengineland.com/google-admits-its-using-very-limited-personalization-in-search-results-305469 
32  Case No COMP/M.5727 - MICROSOFT/ YAHOO! SEARCH BUSINESS, para 111 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  We have learned during interviews that, even when having access to the data, the cost of developing and regularly 








necessarily attract more users. However, when advertisement revenues are invested in upgrades of 
hardware, indexing, human capital and updating the algorithm, this translates in a higher quality 
perceived by searchers. This attracts more searchers which in turn attracts more advertisers.  
  
A third reason for high concentration may be related to user stickiness, possibly in combination with 
strategies of tying and bundling. These arguments were put forth by the European Commission in 
the Google Android case36 and by the Russian antitrust authorities in a similar case against Google. 
These cases were about pre-installing Google Chrome and Google Search on Android devices, 
which was said to contribute to Google’s market share in the search market (at least for mobile 
search services). In Russia, this tying practice has been resolved for several years since 2017 and 
it appears to have levelled the playing field in mobile search (see figure below). 
 
 
Figure 3-2  Mobile Search Market Shares in the Russian Federation (January 2009 – March 2020) 
 
Source: StatCounter Global Statistics 
 
 
Data sharing may not be sufficient to strengthen competition  
If data sharing does not result in entry, the question remains whether data sharing can strengthen 
competition among incumbents. It has been argued that, as a result of learning effects, “a small 
initial data advantage can translate into a significant share of the user base and of the market. In 
the long run, this self-reinforcing dynamic can lead to market dominance” (Anderson, 2020). This 
implies that data sharing would neutralise first-mover advantages and lead to stronger quality 
competition, i.e. to more investments in indexes and algorithms. Argenton & Prüfer (2012) argue it 
does and they propose a general and reciprocal obligation for search engines to share data. 
Reciprocity is necessary, they argue, because an asymmetric obligation will unlevel the playing field 
for the first mover and tip the market in favour of the second mover37. Argenton & Prüfer argue that 
reciprocity in data sharing will ensure that all search engines compete fiercer by improving their 
algorithm, rather than by exploiting network effects and first-mover data advantages38.  
 
                                                          
36  Case AT. 40099 (Google Android) 
37  Consider the size of the database of the 1st mover as N1 and of the second mover as N2 and consider that N1>N2. 
Because N1 is larger, the quality of the 1st mover’s search results are better and its market share is higher and growing, 
and the market will eventually tip in favour of the 1st mover. If the 2nd mover is granted access to N1, his database grows to 
N1+N2 which is by definition larger than N1. If data sharing is not reciprocal, the 2nd mover will see its search results 
become better than the results of the 1st mover. Over time, the 2nd mover will overtake the market share of the 1st mover 
and the market would eventually tip in favour of 2nd mover. 
38  “no search engine can rest on its merits because the only way to sustain its market share and profits is to invest all 













































Before going into the logic behind the reasoning of Argenton and Prüfer, we note that theories 
supporting the positive effects of data sharing on competition and innovation abstract from the 
possibility that data sharing may create opportunities for reversed engineering. In that case, the 
incentives to invest may decline for all parties involved (see also section 3.3.6 below).  
 
The conclusion that data sharing results in positive effects for competition and innovation assumes 
that data feedback loops and scale effects in the learning process are dominant determinants of 
quality and competition. However, other factors may also be important determinants of quality and 
competition. These include investments in innovative activities such as updating the index more 
efficiently and more frequently39 40, developing a separate index specifically for mobile search41 42, 
human-based innovations and testing of search algorithms43 44,  or speeding up loading time45. 
Moreover, a search engine’s leading position may also be explained by strategic behaviour like 
tying and bundling (as in the above example of mobile search in Russia). 
 
To examine the relative importance of data feedback loops for competition, we discuss two natural 
experiments in different language areas: English and Russian. Note that search services are 
language-dependent; this involves the index (because websites provide content in different 
languages) as well as the algorithm and the associated feedback loops (because search queries 
are entered in different languages). Further note that the Russian language is fundamentally 
different from the English language, amongst others, because of the use of a different alphabet46.  
 
The first experiment concerns the merger between Bing and Yahoo in the United States, which took 
place in 2010. The merger resulted in an overnight doubling of the query volume for the parties 
involved. While Bing and Yahoo focus primarily on the English language, one would expect this 
merger to have some positive impact on the market shares of Bing and Yahoo in (at least) the 
United States and the United Kingdom. We call this Hypothesis 1. Figure 3-3 below shows that this 
hypothesis is rejected, since the merger in 2010 had little to no impact on the market shares in the 
United States47.  
 
                                                          
39  https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/our-new-search-index-caffeine.html 
40  https://www.brafton.co.uk/news/seo-case-study-sites-see-more-pages-indexed-by-google-than-bing-even-post-panda-
800527170/ 
41  https://webmasters.googleblog.com/2016/11/mobile-first-indexing.html 
42  http://www.thesempost.com/bing-search-will-not-mobile-first-search-index/ 
43  See section 3.3.1 
44  https://searchengineland.com/bing-search-quality-rating-guidelines-130592 
45  During the interviews, respondents (other than Google) stated that ‘loading time’ is an important quality feature in the 
perception of end-users. Google happens to outperform others https://www.shoutmeloud.com/google-started-ranking-
websites-based-on-load-time-and-speed.html 
46  https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/18/technology/18google.html  









Figure 3-3  Search Engine Market Shares in the United States (January 2009 – March 2020) 
 
Source: StatCounter Global Statistics 
 
The rejection of hypothesis 1 could mean that the damage (in the form of market tipping) had 
already been done at the time of the merger and that merging the data sets of Microsoft and Yahoo 
could not revert this process. It may also mean that the statistics on market shares provide a 
misleading picture of the volume of data available to Microsoft and Yahoo at the time of the merger. 
At the time, Microsoft was able to observe search data through Internet Explorer48, which was the 
most frequently used browser in desktop environment in the U.S. (with a market share of 70% in 
2009)49. Accordingly, Microsoft should have been able to gather a significant volume of data on 
search queries and clicking behaviour (63% to be specific)50. The rejection of hypothesis 1, 
however, could also mean that data feedback loops are not as important as some have argued, and 
that Google’s leading position must be explained by other factors.  
 
The second experiment is the entry of Google into the Russian market in 2006. Yandex, founded in 
1997, already occupied a leading position as Russian’s national search engine. If language 
dependent feedback loops are a dominant driver of a search engine’s market share, one would 
expect Google to fail in gaining any market share in Russia as a result of a second-mover 
disadvantage. (We call this hypothesis 2a). If feedback loops are not language dependent, 
however, one would expect Google to crush Yandex because of its global scale advantage. (We 
call this hypothesis 2b). The figure below shows that both hypotheses are rejected. In other words, 
Google gains market share but fails to crush Yandex.  
 
                                                          
48  https://www.businessinsider.com/bing-is-cribbing-from-google-search-results-2011-2?international=true&r=US&IR=T 
49  https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/desktop/united-states-of-america/#monthly-200901-202003 
50  If 90% of the market is using Google’s search engine, but 70% accesses the Google website via Microsoft’s web browsers, 








Figure 3-4  Search Engine Market Shares in the Russian Federation (January 2009 – March 2020) 
 
Source: StatCounter Global Statistics 
 
The observed difference between the development of market shares in the U.S. and in Russia is 
remarkable and cannot be explained by governmental preferential treatment51. Indeed, language is 
important in search engine technology and it did provide Google with serious challenges when 
entering the Russian market52 53. Google has successfully taken up this challenge but failed to 
leverage its presumed global scale advantage in data. This implies that data feedback loops are 
perhaps not a dominant driver of competition, and that other determinants of Google’s competitive 
position are at least equally important. For example, in 2009, Yandex introduced a new machine-
learning algorithm MatrixNet which was said to contribute to the restoration of Yandex’s market 
early 2010’s54. Moreover, a strong indication that anti-competitive tying and bundling is a major 
determinant of Google’s leading position can be found in the earlier mentioned fact that Google’s 
market share in the Russian mobile search market declined rapidly after the Russian competition 
authorities obliged Google to untie its Chrome browser and search engine from its Android 
operating system. 
 
All in all, there is strong evidence that data sharing alone is not responsible for the observed 
unbalanced competition in the search markets in the U.S and Europe. It is thus not obvious that 
data sharing will lead to a more balanced competition. Experience in Russian indicates that antitrust 
enforcement is important (and may already be sufficient) for restoring competition in the search 
market.  
 
3.3.4 Are there bottlenecks for accessing necessary data? 
Because of the high and recurring (sunk) investments in developing and maintaining a high-quality 
index, there are only a few companies that invest in crawling and indexing (e.g. Google, Microsoft, 
Yandex and Baidu). There are indeed public libraries and open source crawlers (such as Common 
Crawl). However, during interviews it was explained that their scale and (more importantly) their 
quality is insufficient for setting up a search service that can effectively compete with the four 
incumbents. Access to one of the main indexes may be considered a bottleneck (or at least an 
entry barrier requiring substantial efforts and time to overcome) for supplying search services.  
 
                                                          
51  As could be argued in China. 
52  https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/18/yandex-is-beating-google-in-russia.html  
 https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/18/technology/18google.html 
53  Although Yandex is on occasion outperforming Google even in the English language (see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5HOw01rpG20) 







It has been argued that companies other than Google fail to realise the necessary scale in data on 
search queries and clicking behaviour because of Google’s data-related first mover advantage. We 
noted earlier that the relative importance of these scale effects is not robustly supported by 
empirical evidence. Although search data can also be collected through alternative sources (such 
as web browsers and browser plug-ins or extensions), competitors have increasingly been cut off 
from browser originated data by Google’s growth in the browser market55, possibly supported by 
anti-competitive conduct56. As a result, during the last decade it has become more likely that 
access to data on search queries and clicking behaviour forms a bottleneck.  
 
Contextual data on location and devices are generally easily accessible. Data on past search 
behaviour and clicking behaviour at the individual level, however, are not.  
 
3.3.5 Is necessary data shared (voluntarily, on a commercial basis)? 
There are no commercial agreements that make any of the four major indexes accessible for 
search algorithms of third parties. This does not mean that the owners of these indexes are 
unwilling to provide commercial access. Given the asymmetric distribution of market shares in the 
retail market for search services, it seems logical for smaller parties (like Bing and Yandex) to be 
willing to provide such access in return for an appropriate price or in return for data on search 
queries and clicking behaviour. Such an access service would provide them with additional 
wholesale revenues or increased access to data. However, it appears there is little to no demand 
for accessing proprietary indexes because the required investments in the development and 
maintenance of algorithms are too high (as was confirmed during interviews).  
 
Data on search queries and clicking behaviour are not shared with third parties. During interviews, 
small niche players expressed no interest in having access to search data and larger players 
(plural) stated that they are hesitant to share search data on a large scale because of privacy 
considerations and risks of revealing trade secrets through reverse engineering.  
 
Search results are shared based on commercial agreements. These sharing agreements are made 
with (small) niche players that complement the main service of the access provider (usually, a 
service that markets high privacy, e.g. DuckDuckGo using Bing and Startpage using Google). The 
risk of reverse engineering is perceived as small by the providers of search results because access 
seekers lack the resources to finance such research. Also, the commercial agreements explicitly 
prohibit reverse engineering.  
 
3.3.6 What is the impact of mandatory data sharing on innovation incentives? 
Section 3.3.3 explains that providing access to search data is unlikely to invite new entry by small-
scale search providers. Moreover, it would not spur current resellers of search results to invest in 
their own algorithms or index because they lack the necessary scale for recouping these 
investments.  
 
Argenton & Prüfer (2012) show, in a theoretical model, that reciprocal sharing of data between 
existing search providers proposal could spur innovation, search quality, consumer surplus, and 
total welfare because, as a result of it, “no search engine can rest on its merits because the only 
way to sustain its market share and profits is to invest all efficiency gains that come from the 
exploitation of network externalities in better quality.” This conclusion assumes that data sharing 
results in more balanced competition, which is not evident (as argued in section 3.3.3). Moreover, 
this conclusion is based on the notion that sharing does not negatively affect the incentives to 
innovate because the data on search queries are assumed to be by-products of previous 
                                                          
55  See https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/desktop/united-states-of-america/#monthly-200901-202003 and 
https://gs.statcounter.com/browser-market-share/desktop/europe#monthly-200901-202003 







production processes and not the result of dedicated investments. This reasoning may not be 
correct when access to search data on a large scale allows others to reverse engineer the 
algorithm or the search results of the current market leader. Copying search results basically boils 
down to updating one’s index based on observed combinations of search queries and clicking 
behaviour, rather than on examining the true content of a website by crawling it. 
 
The risk of reverse engineering is illustrated by an episode in 2011, when Google conducted an 
experiment to verify its suspicions of Microsoft reversely engineering Google's search results based 
on data retrieved via its web browser (Internet Explorer)57. The experiment involved a manipulation 
by Google of its index, relating non-existing words to random websites. Next, Google instructed 20 
employees to regularly visit the Google website using Microsoft’s Internet explorer, to search for 
these non-existing words, and to click the results. Google claimed that the ‘fake results’ started to 
show up in Bing’s search results only after a few weeks. At the time, Microsoft confirmed that it was 
collecting search and clicking data through its browser and toolbar but denied that it was copying 
Google results and argued that there are alternative explanations for the outcome of Google’s 
experiment, but did not go into further details58.  
 
Next to possibly harming innovations in search technology, data sharing obligations may take away 
incentives to invest in alternative services or products through which search data may be collected, 
notably web browsers and browser extensions.  
 
3.3.7 What are the risks of data sharing? 
Besides risks of reverse engineering and associated negative incentives to innovate (see above), 
there are possible privacy risks. Data on search queries and clicking behaviour are stored in 
combination with many personal identifiers (such as IP address, cookies functioning as ID, browser 
fingerprints, account names, et cetera). Sharing this raw data creates privacy risks. Moreover, it 
may not be necessary as the data on search queries and clicking behaviour could be anonymised 
before being shared.  
 
It has been argued that data can always be de-anonymised. An often-cited example is the story of 
New York Times journalists being able to re-identify ‘Searcher No. 4417749’ from anonymised AOL 
search logs59. However, the search results in this example were not stripped from identifiers, they 
were simply replaced by a number allowing to single out an individual. In other words, the data was 
pseudonymised rather than anonymised. Without this identification number, however, and without 
any other identifiers or contextual information (not even data on location or demographic variables), 
the data would be fully anonymised and only exist of sets of search queries and subsequent 
clicking behaviour. In that case, it would not have been possible to single out an individual, nor 
would be it be possible to trace back the search queries to a specific person. 
 
Data can be anonymised to different degrees60, but the more it is anonymised, the less useful data 
tends to become. For example, clicking behaviour may be misinterpreted without any contextual 
information such as location, device used, and a person’s past search behaviour. Adar (2007) 
provides certain solutions to balance privacy and research needs. Over time, this balance is difficult 
to maintain, however, as the possibilities for re-identification seem to be increasing over time 
(Article 29 Working Party, 2014). Rocher et al. (2019) show that re-identification is possible even 
with a minimum of information about personal characteristics. 
 
                                                          
57  https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/microsofts-bing-uses-google-search.html 
58  https://www.businessinsider.com/bing-is-cribbing-from-google-search-results-2011-2 
59  https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html 







3.3.8 What are the options under current legislation to make data sharing mandatory? 
We have established that search data is indispensable for search engine operators and that there 
may be a bottleneck for accessing such data. Some have argued that mandatory data sharing 
would increase innovation-based competition. We have concluded above that this does not 
necessarily lead to more competition, and that it may also lead to less innovations. Having said 
that, we explore below the options under current legislation to make data sharing mandatory. 
 
The GDPR applies to search engines and search data 
Where data on search queries and clicking behaviour can be traced back to an individual, for 
instance by linking it to an IP address or cookie or by storing it in a profile when users are logged-in 
to the search service, it qualifies as personal data. This means that the GDPR provisions apply, 
including the right to data portability.  
 
The personal data included within the scope of application of the right to data portability is personal 
data ‘provided by the data subject’. Search queries are actively inserted by the user and will thus 
fall within this definition (unless they are stripped from personal identifiers).  
 
A user’s clicking behaviour would qualify as ‘observed data’, which the Article 29 Working Party has 
argued to be covered by the GDPR’s right to data portability. Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party 
makes explicit reference to search history as a form of observed data falling within the scope of 
Article 20 GDPR: ‘Observed data provided by the data subject by virtue of the use of the service or 
the device […] may for example include a person’s search history’ (Article 29 Working Party, 2017).  
 
Effectiveness of the right to data portability under the GDPR is limited 
When technically feasible, Article 20(2) GDPR would require that personal data is directly 
transferred between search engines. However, the GDPR’s right to data portability can only be 
used to port the search history of users one-by-one at their request. This means that the 
effectiveness of the right to data portability as a tool for mandating data sharing in the sector 
depends on how actively individuals invoke it.  
 
A second limitation is that it is still unclear to what extent the GDPR’s right to data portability can be 
interpreted as constituting a real-time mechanism with continuous data exchanges between data 
controllers until the data subject revokes his or her request, or solely provides for one-off portability 
where personal data is transferred only once at the moment the data subject makes the request. 
Real-time portability seems more effective to take away bottlenecks in the market than one-off 
portability. 
 
Note that GDPR cannot compel reciprocity in data sharing, this can only be realised when 
requested by the individual. 
 
Essential facility doctrine might apply 
Another possibility for mandating sharing of data on search queries and clicking behaviour is to rely 
on the essential facilities doctrine under competition law. A refusal to share data on search queries 
and clicking behaviour will qualify as abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU when the 
company controlling access to data is dominant and when the following four ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ are present: indispensability, exclusion of effective competition, prevention of the 
introduction of a new product, and absence of objective justification.  
• There are clear legal precedents that indicate a dominant position held by Google in the market 
for online Search.61 
                                                          







• There are no clear legal precedents on the issue of indispensability of data on search queries 
and clicking behaviour held by one party. In past merger cases (e.g. Google/DoubleClick) the 
European Commission argued that Google’s data on users’ search behaviour with 
DoubleClick’s data on web-browsing behaviour of users did not give the merged entity a 
competitive advantage that could not be matched by competitors. While this may have been the 
case at the time (see section 3.3.1), we note that this may no longer be the case today (see 
section 3.3.4).  
• Moreover, there is discussion about how strict the condition of indispensability should be 
applied to cases of refusals to share data which are “generated virtually incidentally and without 
special investment”. Schweitzer et al. (2018) advocate a less strict application of the condition of 
indispensability in such case. Argenton & Prüfer (2012) and Prüfer & Schottmüller (2017) state 
that this condition applies to data on search queries and clicking behaviour. However, as we 
argue in section 3.3.6, this statement is debatable because people click on search results 
presented to them which are an output of investments in the index and the algorithm. 
• When lowering of existing standards is considered appropriate due to the characteristics of data 
and the market conditions in online search, competition authorities get the discretion to adapt 
the application of the competition rules to new circumstances so that there is room to set a new 
precedent based on the existing legal framework.   
 
Essential facility doctrine may require creative interpretation of the law 
When data sharing is desirable, a sharing obligation should be reciprocal according to Argenton & 
Prüfer (2012). Under competition law, however, only dominant search engines could face an 
obligation to share information about previous queries62. However, it is worth examining whether 
reciprocity can serve as a form of reasonable price for data access. In that case, competition law 
could still provide a legal basis for enforcing access. Reciprocity would then at first only apply 
between the largest player and access seekers, whereby the largest player would still retain a data 
advantage63. However, the other players could reduce this lead by also sharing their data on a 
reciprocal basis64. This would not require an obligation, as they all benefit, but an explicit exception 
for this cooperation should be included in Article 101 TFEU which prohibits horizontal cooperation 
between competitors. 
 
Sharing of search data may conflict with Database Directive and/or Trade Secrets Directive  
We note that the disclosure of queries and clicks automatically discloses search results on which a 
user clicked for a particular query. While this is not inferred or derived data, it is data which is 
produced by a search service provider and results from investments in an index and an algorithm. 
                                                          
62  In a recent article about data sharing in general (not specifically related to search engines) Prüfer mitigates his claim on 
general reciprocity and concludes that only “the largest two or three providers are obliged to share [provided they have] 
market shares larger than 20 or 30 per cent”. Reasons for this are that: i) small platform may otherwise experience 
disproportional administrative burden, and ii) because it is said that large firms may benefit more from data sharing than 
small  firms because more likely to have access to other sources of information that complement user information from this 
market (Prüfer, 2019). In our view, these arguments are challengeable. The claim that small platforms would experience a 
disproportionate administrative burden appears contradictory to Prüfer’s own statement that “sharing of user data is 
technically and organizationally possible at a large scale and automatically” (Prüfer, 2019, p. 11). Moreover, if there is such 
problem, it can be addressed by giving such platforms some time for growth before the obligation become effective. 
Second, the claim that large firms may benefit more from data sharing than small firms is disputed by Mayer-Schönberg 
and Ramge (2018). They argue that when “since smaller firms would have less data to share and machine-learning 
algorithms produce diminishing returns for each new data point, a company like Amazon would gain far less than its 
smaller competitors. A data sharing mandate would lift all boats, but to different degrees” (Mayer-Schönberg & Ramge, 
2018, p. 53). Finally, imposing a sharing obligation only on “the largest two or three” providers, provided they have “market 
shares larger than 20 or 30 per cent” seems arbitrary: why not the fourth largest player? why not providers with 10 or 40 
percent? A suggestion like this inevitably leads to a test of dominance as to avoid arbitrariness. A need to establish 
dominance would make it more difficult to impose data sharing obligations and possibly results in a repetitive leapfrogging 
of dominance held the second and first mover (see footnote 37).  
63  If A is obliged to share data with B and C on a reciprocal basis, then A would still have a larger data set (of A+B+C) then B 
and C (of B+A and of C+A, respectively).  







As such, obligations to share search results (or data which may be used to infer search results) 
may conflict with the protection offered by Database Directive and/or the Trade Secrets Directive.  
 
3.3.9 What are other options for stimulating data sharing? 
The European Commission’s decision in the Google Android case effectively increased the choice 
of end-users between mobile browsers. This may allow competitors to increase their market share 
in the browser market, thereby increasing their ability to collect search data. A similar measure 
seems to have restored the balance in the Russian search market (see Figure 3-2). However, it is 
not sure that the same effect will be observed in Europe (this remains to be seen).  
 
An alternative to imposing mandatory data sharing is to support or encourage pooling of 
anonymised search data by various smaller search engines, browsers, apps, and developers of 
innovative browser plug-ins and extensions. Such pooling arrangement may require an exemption 
from Article 101 TFEU on horizontal agreements; possibly there is a need for new block exemptions 
for data pooling arrangements (Crémer, de Montjoye, & Schweitzer, Competition policy for the 
digital era, 2019, p. 98). When governed by a proper code of conduct, governments could offer 
endorsements to data sharing pools and companies that participate in them. Moreover, end-users 
may be asked to give consent to sharing personalised search data between participants of the data 
pool. Advocates of general data sharing obligations may argue that as long as Google does not 
participate in such a pool, the majority of search data remains exclusively at Google’s disposal and 
therefore the measure would not help others overcome their second-mover disadvantage.  
 
Data pooling arrangements might be further stimulated by encouraging data mobility networks such 
as the Data Transfer Project involving Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, Apple, and several 
smaller digital platforms65. Data mobility initiatives could be fostered by mediating discussions 
about the type of data within the scope of the project, establishing rules on reciprocity, and to 
investigate the possibility of continuous data transfer.  
 
Any measure aimed at stimulating or mandating sharing of search data should be accompanied by 
measures that, albeit difficult to enforce, discourage reverse engineering of search results.  




                                                          







4 Case: social networks 
4.1 Case description 
A social network (or social networking service) is an online platform where users connect and 
interact with other users who share certain interests, professional backgrounds, hobbies, or real-life 
connections. There are many types of social networks, as well as platforms that include a social 
networking functionality. Facebook, with consumer functionalities that gravitate toward making 
connections and sharing "posts", is the prime example of a social network or social media. Other 
online platforms combine a distinct service with social networking functionalities. An example is 
Goodreads, a book cataloguing website where users can search for books and reviews, write their 
own reviews, and create their own reading lists, which they can share with other users. Thus, 
Goodreads provides (user-generated) content for book lovers with more narrow interactions among 
readers. Another example is Strava, a platform and app for tracking cycling and running exercises 
with GPS data. The app records activities which can be shared with followers as well as shared 
publicly. 
 
The volumes of data collected by social networks can be enormous, as illustrated by the size of the 
archives of a New York Times reporter's data (all numbers refer to a single person's archive size):66 
• Facebook's archive measured about 650 megabytes (equivalent to 160 hours of music); 
• Google's archive for this person was about 8 gigabytes (about 2,000 hours of music) with an 
extraordinary level of detail; 
• special-interest social networks may be different: LinkedIn's archive was less than 0.5 
megabyte, containing what one would expect (spreadsheets of LinkedIn contacts and 
information that the user added to his account). 
 
Social networks do not only gather data, they also share it with business partners. However, in the 
aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, platforms like Facebook and Twitter have 
implemented restrictions to data access via their APIs. 
 
This case pertains to horizontal and vertical data sharing. The initial hypothesis was that 
(established) social networks are not eager to share their data at all; neither with horizontal 
competitors (for obvious reasons) nor with downstream companies, especially because they could 
extend their business value proposition into upstream territory. The latter would intensify horizontal 
competition. Thus, providing downstream data access can invite entry into the upstream market. 
Furthermore, according to OECD (2019), the provision of data can require significant investments, 
reducing incentives to share data. This implies that if data sharing takes place, there must be 
sufficient possibilities to appropriate the returns on the up-front and follow-on investments, in 
particular in complementary resources such as data models, algorithms for storage and processing, 
and secured IT infrastructures. On top of that there are legal issues related to privacy regulation, 
intellectual property rights and differences between jurisdictions that make parties hesitant to share 
data. 
 
From the outset we expected that the initial hypothesis would only be partially confirmed. The 
reason is that one can observe that social network voluntarily share data, although selectively. An 
example of voluntary data sharing is provided by the social login service ("log in with ..."), which is 
an easy way for companies to get consumers to register on their websites and apps, and by doing 
so, collect information about them. Facebook, Google, Twitter and LinkedIn are examples of 
                                                          







networks providing this login service. It involves data sharing in two directions. The social networks 
provide data to their partners and receive data from them in return. Interestingly, Facebook used to 
forbid close connections with (horizontally) competing social networks through its data access 
conditions. In 2018, however, the company reviewed its policy to block apps built on top of its 
platform that replicated its core functionality and decided to remove this policy. 
 
A central question is what kind of data sharing agreements currently exist. A related question 
concerns the desirability of such commercial arrangements: do they benefit consumers? Do they 
strengthen the market position of social networks? Do they introduce privacy risks? And more 
generally, do they require regulation to keep them in line with public goals? 
 
 
4.2 Preliminary analysis 
Business model 
One can distinguish general-purpose social media, such as Facebook, from social networks 
dedicated to specific groups, for instance athletes. They have in common that they are typically 
based on digital platform business models that occupy a central spot in a multi-sided market. Such 
platforms aim to serve different types of users, for instance consumers and advertisers. More 
generally, as platforms they arrange, coordinate, and orchestrate interactions between users and 
across different user groups. A social network's crucial assets include its community and what its 
members contribute.  
 
The typical business model in social networks aims at generating revenues from data or user 
attention, often through advertising or viewer targeting. Thus, a social network often is an attention 
platform, just as search engines and many online news media.67 Users interested in harvesting 
attention can be advertisers but also companies and organisation using social media to 
communicate with customers and stakeholders. Facebook, for instance, offers tools to firms that 
provide them with information on user engagement with their Facebook pages and their websites. 
Social networks (e.g. Facebook) may also provide data and insights on social media activities for a 
broader audience, such as academic researchers. 
 
Social platforms rely on direct and indirect network effects to become successful: 
1. Direct network effects drive the size of the customer base: users attract other users because of 
the increased number of potential interactions among them. 
2. Indirect network effects drive profitability: users attract platform users interested in user data, 
access to user data, or user attention. 
 
Better and more personalized user experiences stimulate these network effects. 
 
Data 
A large number of types of data are used to improve the quality of matchings, the relevance and 
value of user interactions and consumer targeting, and the platform's functionalities. For these 
purposes, social networks need data about users, such as their social graphs, communication data, 
and profile data containing information about individual characteristics, preferences, behaviour, and 
interactions. Hence, they collect various types of data from a broad range of sources.  
 
First, they harvest data "at the surface" where user interactions take place, in particular user-
generated content such as status updates and pictures posted by users; users' personal data such 
                                                          
67  Evans (2019) gives the following definition: "Attention platforms supply content to consumers who spend time on their 







as name, birth year and address; users' behavioural data such as location history, browsing history 
and search history, on the social network's website as well as elsewhere; data about connections 
with other users (the social graph). Most users will understand that this type of data is necessary to 
support the key user functionalities and may thus be considered provided data. However, users 
may not always be aware of the data that is collected because the data may also be observed on a 
very large number of websites other than the social network's own website (e.g. through cookies 
and invisible pixels that load in the browser to collect information about browsing activities).  
 
Furthermore, social networks may observe data "below the surface" of the basic user interactions, 
such as: activity logs; inferences from all data types; users device information such as operating 
system, hardware version, device settings, battery strength, device identifiers; user device 
locations, including specific geographic locations, such as through GPS, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi 
signals; connection information such as ISP, browser type, language and time zone, phone number 
and IP address; non-personally identifying data such as demographic information, preferences and 
ad interests. Again, such data may also be collected also on websites other than the social 
network's own website. 
 
At a higher level one can distinguish (i) data about and obtained from users; and (ii) a broad range 
of data about people who are not users of the social network, also known as shadow profiles. The 
latter type of data is typically collected on websites other than the social network's own website. 
Turning off the collection of shadow profile data may only be possible after making a user account, 
or by installing browser plug-ins that protect one’s privacy.  
 
A more extensive (but possibly non-exhaustive) data typology with relevance for social networks is 
as follows, noting that several (if not all) categories include data on people without user accounts: 
1. primary personal identifiers (name, address, age, phone number, bank account number, etc.); 
2. secondary personal identifiers (IP address, data from trackers, cookies, device, technical 
parameters w.r.t. hardware and software, etc.); 
3. data about individual behaviour and interactions on the social network (user-generated content, 
user activity logs, user settings, etc.); 
4. data about individual behaviour and interactions elsewhere (browsing, app usage, online 
shopping, etc.); 
5. social graph within the platform's ecosystem (data about connections, followers and friends on 
the social network); 
6. broad social graph (data obtained from address book, phone calls, outside interactions, etc.); 
7. usage context (time, time zone, geographical location, geographical proximity of other users, 
etc.); 
8. network connections (technical parameters w.r.t. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ISP, internet routing, etc.). 
 
Social graph information (data types 5 and 6 above) ranges from: 
• narrowly defined social graph data: at the surface, social graph data pertains to connections, 
friends, follows likes, etc.; 
• broad/deep without limits social graph data: below the surface, a social network may collect 
data about the nature of interactions between connected users (e.g. time, frequency, content, 
etc.). From such data, the platform may know in detail whether people are friends, colleagues, 
lovers, sharing a hobby, playing sports matches together, sports teammates, and so on. The 




The functionalities and technologies that support a platform's activities determine the quality of 







learns how to improve interactions from the earlier interactions it facilitated. Accordingly, learning 
effects create feedback loops. For instance, social networks select and prioritize the posts that 
users view in their "feeds", suggest new connections to users, and more generally, stimulate user 
engagement and time spent on the platform. In similar ways they stimulate relevant cross-platform 
interactions between users and advertisers, or between users and apps within the ecosystem. The 
behavioural responses by the various types of users generate insights for improving the matching 
process. Important goals to which underlying algorithms contribute are growth of its user base, the 
maximization of user engagement through same-side and cross-platform interactions, and revenue 
generation from these interactions. 
 
Social networks, like many other digital platforms, do not have a "single algorithm", but rather a 
wide-ranging system of automated intelligence supported by human intelligence68. Applications and 
functionalities range from simple reporting and business intelligence measurements to more 
advanced machine learning apps, process large quantities of data. In addition, thousands of 
developers are carrying out ad hoc data analyses on a daily basis. Hence, widely used social media 
use a tremendous and rapidly growing data volume, which is also due to the increasing number of 
users and the expansion of functionalities on the platform. Billions of users log in to Facebook on a 




Social platforms stimulate innovation in various ways: 
1. As discussed above, a social network's innovation is above all driven by learning from user 
interactions and the resulting feedback loops that drive its growth. Thus, a company has its 
own developers who are working on innovation on a continuous basis. 
2. Many digital platforms also stimulate innovation by third-party developers active within their 
ecosystems. Think of the large number of third-party apps available on Facebook's platform. 
3. Social networks may cooperate, through data sharing agreements, with downstream service 
providers that use the platform to connect with and serve consumers. An example is the sports 
app Relive (previously) using data from the social network Strava as an input for its own 
functionalities. Here, the degree of a social network's openness, also in terms of access to 
data, influences the scope for downstream innovations developed by third parties. 
 
An implication is that more data is almost always better, even if one abstracts from learning 
possibilities. In particular: 
1. The importance of innovation is a key driver of a social network's data hunger. Each additional 
piece of information may potentially contribute to the quantity and quality of inferences that can 
be drawn from data points. Therefore, a company like Facebook has strong incentives to 
collect as much data as possible. 
2. At the same time, social networks have strong incentives to share data as much as possible. 
This is due to the importance of innovation by third-party developers and downstream service 
providers. What they develop can add value to the platform's ecosystem, and hence attract 
more users, advertisers, and so on.  
 
Having pointed out the importance of data for innovation, it is crucial to understand that human 
creativity is of utmost importance. This is because innovation is not only about finding more and 
more correlations between data points. It also involves figuring out new and complementary 
functionalities on and off a social network's platform.  
                                                          
68  Thusoo et al. (2010).  







The nature of innovations by and on a platform makes social networks different from regular 
companies, including traditional software manufacturers. The latter type of firm develops a "finite" 
product, that is, with a delineated scope and a planned completion date. Thus, a regular company 
typically employs a "linear" development process. Platforms like Facebook tend to be in a 
"perpetual development mode", if only to keep up with rapid growth of their user bases and user 
activities70. This can be observed in continuously increasing development activities and codebase, 
an ongoing trend at practically all internet-based companies. There is no grand plan aiming at a 
final, well-specified social media service. Facebook, for instance, deploys new code on a daily basis 
day, balancing fast development with good judgment and monitoring. Each new piece of code is 
reviewed by another engineer, which has as a side effect that knowledge about coding and also the 
code itself is quickly and continuously shared within the community of engineers. 
 
Twitter illustrates that collecting, processing and analysing high data volumes go hand in hand with 
an increasing number of people71. Its analytics platform (performing the data mining of its big data 
sets) has experienced high growth over the years, dealing with increasing complexity, an increasing 
number of users, and more variety of use cases. In 2010, Twitter employed about 100 employees 
(including an analytics team of four). In 2013, the company already had 2,700 employees (its 
current size is about five thousand) and was dealing with a daily raw data intake of around one 
hundred terabytes72. 
 
A push process of adding new code with a high frequency balances innovation speed with risk 
control. This is where the organizational culture matters, as illustrated by Facebook73. The 
increasing scale in the team of engineers, the volume of code, and the user base goes hand in 
hand with growing risks. The higher number of interactions implies that more mistakes and errors 
can occur. These risks cannot be avoided, but they can be managed. For instance, functionalities 
that relate to user privacy will be held to a higher standard. A culture of personal responsibility then 
contributes to quality control: developers have to support the operational use of their code, which 
gives them a stake in the process of software development. They also get a lot of discretion with 
regard to the ideas and projects they work on, and the teams they work in. Accordingly, the culture 
is geared towards freeing up creativity in a decentralised fashion, relying on the efforts and ideas of 
individuals and teams, and without specifying products in advance. 
 
 
4.3 Analysis of research questions 
4.3.1 Which role does data play in the business model? 
The short answer is that almost all data about users add value to social networks. This is because a 
wide range of data types can be used to figure out how to grow the user base, how to let users 
interact and engage more, and how to generate revenues from their activities and the follow-on 
data flows. A wide (virtually unlimited) range of data forms a continuous stream of input the 
learning, development and innovation processes. Of particular importance for social networks are: 
• user-generated content, providing the primary value for other users (content to consume) and 
for users themselves (i.e. “stored value” through the personal posts history); 
• social graph data, describing connections with other users (and possibly also with non-users, 
in case data on social relationships can be observed or obtained somewhere);  
• profiling data, containing information about user characteristics and preferences; 
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• behavioural data, collected by observing what users and non-users do on and off the social 
network's platform.  
 
Network effects, matching and user interactions 
The essence of social networks lies in the functionality to form connections with (and follow) other 
users. These links provide users with access to each other for communicating and sharing content 
(e.g. posts and pictures) with each other. A user's set of established connections, the "social 
graph", forms a key input to the functionalities that support user interactions.  
 
Social networks aim at growth of the user base, the maximization of user engagement (see below) 
and interactions, and revenue generation from engagement and interactions. Network effects form 
the basis for these goals. Therefore, the benefits of data are driven by: 
1. Direct network effects: with a large user base, a platform can collect large amounts of various 
types of data from users, as well as from persons who do not use the social network. More, 
better and richer data increase revenues, and may create new profit opportunities. 
2. Indirect network effects: the collected data may contribute to revenues through, for instance, 
advertising and the selling of slices of data. Instead of directly selling data, a social network's 
business models may sell access to user attention, or the possibility to target users. 
 
Third parties, such as developers of apps on a social network site, may directly or indirectly benefit 
from the social graph and associated data.74 For instance, regarding the second point above, 
Facebook has apparently never sold user data, but instead selectively grants other companies with 
partial access to its platform as long as this supports its own business model.75 
 
User engagement 
User engagement is essential for the collection of user-generated content, social graph data and 
behavioural data. This has two dimensions. First, there is direct user engagement, involving the 
activities carried out and time spent on the platform. In combination with profile data, these 
behavioural data may enable the platform to learn how to increase user engagement or to identify 
and suggest potential (relevant) extensions to one's social graphs. Second, indirect engagement 
occurs through user involvement with third-party apps and by visiting other websites that connect 
with the platform in various ways. Again, more information is always better, as it can contribute to 
better functionalities, better targeting for advertisers, and so on. 
 
In addition to indirect user engagement, platforms may aim at engagement by non-users. Social 
networks sometimes track people without user accounts and monitor their online behaviour all over 
the internet. The general purpose is to harvest data anywhere and about anyone. This supports 




Social networks aim at capturing users' attention, for example, by means of ‘feeds’. For this 
purpose, it is important to predict the attractiveness of content to particular users76. More engaging 
feeds increase the likelihood that users will keep busy on the platform. Such predictions benefit 
from detailed information about consumers' preferences and behaviour, which sheds light on the 
"data hunger" of social networks.77 
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Facebook's revenues per user are significantly larger than those of rivals like Twitter, Snapchat and 
Pinterest.78 The company presumably has the richest user data, allowing it to select ads that users 
do not find intrusive, resulting in a relatively high portion of ads relative to the amount of other 
content, and driving the willingness to pay for advertisements.  
 
Data for innovation 
Innovation by digital platforms such as social networks is partly (and to a large extent) driven by 
data. The continuous development process facilitates live experimentation using A/B testing. This 
involves new functionalities and other innovations to be implemented and deployed immediately, 
directly followed by an assessment of the impact on user behaviour (initially on small user groups). 
Such testing quickly generates data about the tested features, which can then be used for fine-
tuning and roll-out. At Facebook, for instance, engineers perform tests of new code and run 
thousands of regression tests to check for mistakes and performance. Thus, developers are 
constantly working on new code, testing it to generate data and learning from the findings79. 
 
4.3.2 Which data are indispensable?  
A social network, by definition, needs social graph data 
Social data containing information on social graphs of users and data on user interactions can be 
viewed as necessary for any social network. The reason is that these data types are necessary 
inputs for the core functionality and features for users. 
 
Business models dictate additional data requirements 
Beyond social data supporting a social network's core user functionalities, there is no single or 
clearly identifiable type of data that is essential or necessary. The underlying business model, 
which may come in many colours and shapes, will dictate which data types are necessary for a 
viable proposition. 
 
For a subscription-based social network aiming at specific (e.g. professional) user groups, profile 
data need to be less rich and diverse compared to social networks with an advertising model. For 
general-purpose social networks that generate revenues from harvested data, the profile data 
cannot be diverse enough to be of value to the wide variety of third parties such as advertisers, app 
developers and data resellers. Some types of data will be of immediate value to current third-party 
users, while other types may depend on future innovations and users. Therefore, some social 
networks tend to collect virtually all data about users as well as non-users (personal data, 
behavioural data, device data, inferred data, apps used etc.), whether or not they are using the 
social network at the time of capturing the data. All such data may ultimately support user growth, 
innovation and revenue generation. 
 
4.3.3 Can access to indispensable data facilitate entry or strengthen competition? 
Impact of data sharing on competition 
The literature often mentions data portability as a means to reduce customer lock-in and to increase 
customer mobility. Even when users multi-home, they may still be "trapped" in a certain platform 
because they do not want to leave behind their existing connections and the content uploaded by 
these connections as well as by themselves. An entrant's incentives to innovate will increase if it 
gets easier to attract customers. Thus, certain types of data sharing, in particular data portability, 
                                                          
78  "Why Facebook generates much more money per user than its rivals", CNBC 1 November 2019. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/01/facebook-towers-over-rivals-in-the-critical-metric-of-revenue-per-user.html (retrieved 19 
April 2020). 







can make horizontal competition more effective. In markets where consumers multi-home, the 
impact may be modest though. 
 
Data portability, and data sharing in general, may also lead to the creation of vertical or 
downstream business models that build upon an incumbent's data. While the impact on competition 
and innovation is not obvious80, note that such data sharing strengthens the platform's ecosystem 
and at the same time leads to new business models (by developers using the platform's data). The 
former effect may lead to a more dominant position for the platform, which makes it hard to make a 
general statement. Furthermore, if the data sharing pertains to profiles, the question is what this 
data is being used for. In case it is used for advertising purposes, data sharing reduces the 
possibilities for differentiation, which is undesirable for consumers, and also for entrants aiming at 
niche markets. Alternatively, if the data sharing pertains to social data (describing the social graph 
and interactions with other users), then it may increase customer mobility and possibly multi-
homing. This has a positive impact on differentiation and competition, although in many social 
network markets, consumers already multi-home. 
 
A social network may circumvent its own unwillingness to facilitate multi-homing with rival platforms 
through mergers and acquisitions. For instance, Facebook's acquisitions of WhatsApp and 
Instagram expanded its ecosystem for which it would make sense to allow for user interactions and 
user data pass-throughs across the three platforms. Such a move could easily lead to further 
antitrust scrutiny though. 
 
Does data form an entry barrier? 
A common example of a potential entry barrier in social media does not relate to data, but to the 
presence of network effects of an installed user base. Even for such an obvious candidate for a 
cause of an entry barrier, one must ask if it actually has the supposed impact. For instance, the 
Dutch social network Hyves, founded in 2004, had built up a strong presence in the Netherlands. 
This was before people got acquainted with Facebook. Still, by 2013 its user base had decreased 
substantially and Hyves was discontinued. Network effects notwithstanding, people left Hyves for 
Facebook, and young users immediately chose Facebook. Note, however, that Facebook's current 
user base is of a different order, so that the example of Hyves does not imply that a rival with a 
comparable social network is able to outcompete Facebook. Challengers will probably have to 
introduce distinct and highly attractive features aiming at new user generations. Moreover, 
anecdotal evidence indicates that users left Hyves because the company failed to keep up 
investment levels in server capacity with the growing user base, harming the user experience 
(Pastoor & Peddemors, 2013).  
 
Regarding the possibility that data forms an entry barrier, note that a new social network that is able 
to attract users will be able to collect similar data as an incumbent. This can take time though. If 
consumers face switching costs, incumbents may have an advantage that is hard to overcome81. 
Still, this does not yet imply the presence of an actual entry barrier.  
 
Suppose that an incumbent possesses a data set similar to what newcomers need to have. A 
possibility for data to engender an entry barrier lies in data-powered economies of scale, resulting 
in positive feedback loops. For instance, social networks with more users can extract more data, 
which helps them to improve the quality of user interactions, and in turn attract more users. Thus, 
the question whether access to data in possession of an incumbent is good for entry and 
competition then depends on economic characteristics of data. Do data substitutability, 
complementarity and data returns to scale give rise to a persistent incumbency advantage that puts 
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entrants at a substantial disadvantage for which they cannot find alternative solutions? These are 
empirical questions that need to be addressed within the context of a specific situation. 
 
In addition, is it mainly because of data characteristics that entry is blocked, or do other aspects 
play a significant role (possibly in combination with data)? Entry barriers may be caused by a 
constellation of market characteristics, many of which may be unrelated to data. Examples are 
network effects, customer switching costs (e.g. due to brand loyalty, administrative burden), and 
difficulties to get financing in the initial business phases. The extent to which these market 
characteristics are present, will be an empirical, context-dependent question. Furthermore, there 
may be legal entry barriers, for instance if privacy protection or intellectual property rights allow an 
incumbent to exclude entrants from using its data. 
 
Entry barriers may not be persistent. To see this, it helps to envisage different types of competitive 
threats to an existing social network82. First, horizontal competitors — suppliers of somewhat 
similar attention platforms, possibly based on other types of social networks or even alternative 
user engagement propositions — may appear on the scene. Second, vertical entrants may threaten 
an incumbent's position. An example is an independent app developer with (or desiring) a data-
sharing agreement with the social network, whose business model evolves into a direct substitute 
for a part of the social network's activities. For instance, the company may incorporate social 
features into the app, or may start operating as an attention platform itself. 
 
An observation that goes beyond data is that new social networks can have a hard time to be 
findable for consumers, making it difficult to grow a significant user base. Downstream firms often 
face similar challenges. For many apps that use (e.g. through APIs) social network data, having 
active users is much more important than having access to data. And even then, sometimes a 
certain aspect may give the impression of an entry barrier, but only for a while. Many new apps and 
platforms, therefore, employ “growth hacks” during the start-up phase, latching onto third party 
platforms (whether via APIs or automated processes to obtain data). Thus, creativeness and 
innovation are key ingredients to overcome hurdles that, at first sight, may look like unsurmountable 
entry barriers. 
 
Overall, one cannot say in general that data forms an entry barrier. Moreover, innovation in 
technology, computer intelligence and business models may render assessments of entry barriers 
obsolete quickly. This is even more so in the light of the fast, ongoing innovation cycles employed 
by digital platforms. It is important to note though that, for social networks, network effects and 
other causes of customer lock-in will slow down such disruptions from innovation. 
 
Does mandatory data access stimulate competition? 
Because of the observations above, establishing the presence of an entry barrier does not 
automatically warrant mandatory access to data. Moreover, one should not consider data in 
isolation. For social networks, having active users may be much more important than having access 
to data, and new users can be attracted in smart ways (innovative features, growth hacks) and by 
cooperating with other (software and device) platforms. 
 
Having observed this, access to an existing social network's data can of course alleviate the 
competition-damping impact of network effects. For instance, data portability may, to some extent, 
encourage consumers to switch to a similar social network. Interoperability, based on real-time 
mutual access to data and functionalities, would help to completely overcome customer lock-in due 
to network effects. Note, however, that interoperability will be hard to specify and implement. It also 
seems to conflict with the dynamic nature of innovation in business models and functionalities. 
                                                          








Allowing downstream apps to benefit from a social network's customer base and user data may not 
introduce direct competition for social networks, but it certainly adds to innovation and market entry 
in a broader sense. At some point, for instance when developers integrate social networking 
features into their apps, they may start threatening the position of established social networks. 
 
As discussed in the report, access to user profiles does not automatically increase competition. 
Sharing such data may, besides privacy issues, put more weight on scale as a precondition to build 
up a competitive market position. The reason is that when different social networks avail of a 
common set of profiles, there are less possibilities to differentiate their targeting propositions to 
advertisers. As a result, platforms will likely differentiate by targeting a theme along with a 
differentiated user group and offer advertiser an opportunity to associate themselves with that user 
group or the social networks’ theme. The mode of mode of competition may thus change (more 
specifically, the mode of differentiation) and it may mitigate the need for data by platforms. But it is 
not clear how this will affect the drive for innovation and ultimately the interests of consumers. 
 
Gans (2018) argues that right to data portability, which typically allows users to take their data to 
another platform, may not be as effective as one would wish. Portability rules typically address only 
data that a user has contributed him- or herself. However, switching costs may also stem from data 
(e.g. content) provided by others. The interactions among users create network effects that also 
give rise to switching costs. To address the larger switching costs due to network effects, Gans 
suggests mandatory identity portability as a means to enhance consumer choice: a user who 
switches to another platform, would then retain his or her permissions to access data provided by 
other users of the social network. This allows a user to leave the ecosystem without losing the 
ability to communicate with existing, remaining connections. Note that this goes beyond data 
portability: it amounts to a form of service interoperability, with has serious drawbacks (as 
discussed below). 
 
4.3.4 Are there bottlenecks for accessing indispensable data? 
A bottleneck or essential facility may be present if there is only a single way of reaching consumers 
or necessary inputs, possibly including data. Strictly speaking, a given social network's social graph 
as a whole is typically exclusive and unique, as it cannot exactly be replicated based on data from 
other sources. To obtain it, one would have to get access through that social network or obtain it 
through the users themselves, which will be cumbersome. Having said that, a priori it does seem 
feasible to replicate a (somewhat similar) social graph or build a new one. 
 
If an established social network does not provide access, then alternative data may be available 
through accessing users' digital address books, web scraping, data markets, or APIs of various 
other platforms. An example is a (downstream) sports app that latches onto devices (e.g. fitness 
trackers) and software platforms that provide access to their user data. This makes it convenient 
(reduced switching cost) for consumers to use the app "on top of" a device's functionality. The 
benefit is mutual, as a fitness tracker's platform sees its ecosystem value go up, and also gets more 
brand name recognition (through the app). 
 
This example shows that, as a myriad of data types can have direct or indirect commercial value, 
there can be room to innovate in smart ways of collecting (possibly different but) more relevant or 
more timely data. A challenger of an incumbent social network might also find ways to collect data 
that is similar to the incumbent's data or has similar value. Thus, data does not automatically imply 









4.3.5 Is indispensable data being shared (voluntarily, on a commercial basis)? 
Data sharing is very common 
Social networks like Facebook and Strava tend to have a very large number of data-sharing 
agreements with various parties, such as developers of apps that run on the social network's 
platform, developers of (standalone or off-platform) apps that run on mobile devices, websites, and 
advertisers. There may also be indirect relationships with third parties that need data, namely 
through resellers. 
 
In what follows, we discuss in some more detail which types of agreements can be observed in 
practice. Note, however, that we cannot assess if these agreements pertain to indispensable data. 
To the contrary, one encounters several examples in which data is very useful for the business 
model of a complementary app, but strictly speaking not essential. This is illustrated by cases in 
which the abandonment of an agreement did not inflict fatalities on app developers. 
 
Practices of data sharing 
Data-sharing is typically carried out through APIs. For instance, social network may provide "open" 
(free to use) APIs that give third-party developers access to services or a social network's 
proprietary data. These developers mix and process this data to be used by their apps. Open APIs 
are often proprietary software, providing packaged and restricted data without allowing developers 
to adapt the interface. Developers may not exactly know what an API does, in particular if it is 
provided as an executable file instead of the source code.83 
 
The data shared through APIs is limited and different API tools may provide varying levels of 
access. Presumably, shared data typically does not contain social graph data, as this is highly 
important for network effects of social networks. Another reason is that privacy regulations make it 
hard, if not impossible, to share such data (if only because a user's connections would also have to 
give consent). On Facebook, for instance, in order to access data beyond public profiles of users, 
developers must (i) specify their data request (ii) obtain user consent; and (iii) let their apps retrieve 
the platform's data in line with the user’s direction. They have to agree to Facebook’s terms of use, 
which aim to protect Facebook's users and their data, as well as the quality of features and 
functions that are part of the platform's user experience. 
 
Some examples related to Facebook illustrate data-sharing in practice:84 
• On mobile devices, Facebook uses various software tools, known as Business Tools, to 
routinely track users (also if they are logged out) as well as non-users, also outside its platform. 
App developers share data through a set of development tools known as the Facebook 
Business SDK (Software Development Kit), allowing them to build apps for specific operating 
systems. Apps that automatically send data about users and their behaviour on apps to 
Facebook typically combine it with a unique identifier, the Google advertising ID on Android 
phones (AAID) or Apple’s equivalent on iPhones (IDFA). This ID allows advertisers to link very 
detailed user data collected from different apps and browsing into a single user profile, providing 
them with a fine-grained and intimate picture of individual persons. Facebook’s Cookies Policy 
describes how people without Facebook accounts can opt out of cookies to show them ads, but 
apparently, such data is also being shared, as shown by tests of opt-outs. Facebook lays the 
responsibility for lawful data practices (collection, usage, sharing) on app developers; the SDK's 
default implementation automatically sends event data to Facebook. Also, due to Facebook's 
lack of transparency, it is impossible to know how shared data is being used.85 
• Partnerships with device makers (e.g. Apple, Amazon, BlackBerry, Microsoft and Samsung) 
allow them to offer social networking features such as messaging, “like” buttons and address 
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books. For Facebook, device partners get access to the Facebook app and custom-built apps 
and integrations belonging to the "Facebook experience". This may allow them to retrieve 
personal data (in the past also about users' Facebook friends, even if they did not give 
Facebook permission to share information with third parties).86 
• Facebook's social login makes life easy for users of third-party apps and websites, as they 
reduce the hassle with passwords. The mechanism is that Facebook receives data about the 
users of the app or website (e.g. e-mail addresses) and can contact them with suggestions 
about users of the app to follow. 
 
It is very hard to provide a complete picture of current data-sharing practices. A series of articles in 
The New York Times gives a fairly detailed account of recent practices, some of which have begun 
to receive political and legal scrutiny triggered by the Cambridge Analytica scandal. Some more 
examples of data-sharing during the last decade are:87 
• Facebook shares (or shared) contact information with hundreds of advertisers, most of which 
users have never interacted with. 
• Advertisers who have obtained personal data elsewhere can upload this into Facebook through 
a tool called Customer Audiences, which helps them connect this data to Facebook profiles and 
then serve them targeted ads. 
• Some of Facebook's APIs allow users of third-party apps or online services to follow Facebook 
friends, a feature that helps new apps to speed up user growth. An example was Vine, a video-
sharing service. When signing up for the service, new users were given the option of following 
Facebook friends. Facebook, however, shut down the friends access API, as Vine competed 
with Facebook' own features. Through Instagram, introduced its own short-form video feature 
shortly after. Its growth stagnated and Vine closed shop. 
• To strengthen Facebook's position as an ecosystem at the heart of online activities, at some 
point the company tended towards reciprocal data-sharing agreements, giving third-party 
developers the ability to connect apps to Facebook (allowing users to post app activities on 
Facebook timelines) in exchange for data that they collect. The idea was to make its platform 
more attractive for developers. According to Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg: social apps "may 
be good for the world but it’s not good for us unless people also share back to Facebook" (NYT 
5 December 2018). Later, the reciprocity rule was weakened by dropping the requirement to 
send usage data back to Facebook. 
 
The above impression is unlikely to reflect the current practice, as Facebook had to scale back its 
data practices in response to political and legal scrutiny and investigations.88 One may expect 
though that current data deals exist for the sole purpose of supporting its business model, that is, its 
partners help Facebook to expand and attract new users who spend time on Facebook and 
contribute to its ad revenues. In case its partners receive user data in return, one may presume that 
Facebook has put checks and balances in place, at least to make sure that there is no violation of 
legal requirements. 
 
Motives for data sharing 
Social networks benefit from (vertical) data-sharing agreements, even though they tend to form 
relatively closed ecosystems spanned by their user bases.89 For instance, Facebook forms data 
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partnerships as a way to integrate Facebook’s services into apps, devices and websites by third 
parties. Indirectly, these partners help Facebook to grow and get new users on board. who spend 
time on the platform and contribute to ad revenues.90 Facebook made a myriad of such agreements 
that are typically subject to confidentiality. In many cases the company shared personal data while 
ignoring users' privacy settings, and without asking users for consent or informing them about the 
extent of the data-sharing. 
 
Third-party developers and partners with data agreements can share data with a social network by 
installing software development kits, pixels, or a social login tool. Such pieces of code can collect 
user engagement data and share it with the platform. The social login provides an effective 
illustration of benefits obtained by a social network. While Facebook apparently doesn't receive 
behavioural data in return from apps and websites, the integrated login functionality allows the 
company to track usage through metadata. Thus, the social login functionality allows Facebook to 
track usage from thousands of apps and websites. This provides them with an enormous 
knowledge, on a real-time basis, about market shares and whatever can be inferred from the 
metadata. 
 
Third parties (that is, customers) may benefit from (vertical) data-sharing agreements with social 
networks for various reasons, in particular realizing growth and targeting consumers.91 Pieces of 
code implemented through software development kits, pixels, and social login tools collect user 
engagement data that can be used to help the platform's partners to assess and improve the 
effectiveness of advertising and targeting, and to obtain insights about their user base. App 
developers, for instance, can get access to an enormous potential of customers by connecting to an 
established social network. An option to follow friends on a big social network is a convenient tool 
for apps to accelerate user growth, in particular if access is free (as is the case for Open APIs). 
Such interfaces allow developers to combine a social network's proprietary data about users with 
their own data and integrate it into their apps' functionalities. In addition, data about users and the 
social graph can give them novel (otherwise unavailable) insights and form valuable inputs for 
innovation. Advertisers are able to target ads with user data. For instance, Facebook shares a 
variety of tools and data to increase advertisers' understanding of the effectiveness of ad 
campaigns. This enables them to measure and track the performance of ads on the platform in real 
time with metrics for reporting, insights and conversion. 
 
Consumers may benefit from data-sharing because of, for instance, convenience (e.g. social 
logins), innovative features (e.g. social network functionalities integrated in third-party apps and 
devices), and more relevant ads. 
 
Bargaining power in data-sharing agreements 
While both sides benefit from data-sharing agreements, bargaining power may be asymmetric. 
The big social networks (also in niche markets) tend to assert full discretion over the commercial 
data-sharing relationships with many third parties, for instance regarding who can access data 
about users and social graphs, and in which manner. As the provider of the data (API platform), 
they have all the power to modify or terminate access to the platform. The only bargaining power of 
an API user stems from size, which occurs when a customer is large enough to enter a custom 
(long-term) agreements instead of the “as-is” nature of public APIs. Note, however, that closing 
access for a particular app tends to generate bad publicity for the data provider, as was observed 
when Strava foreclosed Relive. This tends to be temporary though and hardly impacts end-users.  
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The closed-source nature of open APIs contributes to the dependence of developers on the APIs' 
owners and vendors. An API may include a key (a text string that identifies a developer as the 
source of an API request), which provides possibilities to monitor users and to control (and possibly 
suspend) their API usage.92  
 
There are various ways in which APIs can be used to exert power over third parties, as is clear from 
Facebook's Platform Policy:93 (i) Monitoring API usage: according to Facebook’s policy, it reserves 
the right to create apps similar to apps that integrate with its Graph API. (ii) Limiting or cutting off 
API access: according to Facebook’s policy, it reserves the right to block Graph API access. (iii) 
Change the available data or the structure of the data: Facebook changed (e.g. through 
depreciation) the Graph API functionalities. The Graph API allowed third-party apps to post updates 
on users' profiles, which were visible to friends. These developers also obtained data about 
Facebook users, including social graph data and locations. 
 
Some examples in which such practices have been applied by various social networks are the 
following: 
• During (roughly) the last decade, Facebook and other social network have limited third parties' 
access to data. For instance, in 2007 a third party on Facebook had access to individual profile 
data, friends lists, and selected data about friends (conditional on a user’s permission). In 2015, 
a typical third party could only access a user’s friends also using its app. Facebook 
implemented these changes through the “end points” where third parties can download user 
data and the rules for accessing them (hence through the APIs).94 
• Twitter uses APIs that require authentication of data requests and impose additional terms on 
developers with high-volume usage. It also provides Twitter the possibility to control third-party 
apps that pose a competitive threat.95 In 2015, DataSift (a data reseller) announced that Twitter 
was ending their relationship. Customers who wanted continued access to Twitter's "firehose" 
would have to set up a connect with Gnip, a data provider (social media API aggregation 
company) acquired by Twitter in 2014.96 Another example was the termination by Twitter of a 
sharing agreement with PeopleBrowsr, apparently because it viewed PeopleBrowsr's services 
as incompatible with its adapted business model.97 The overall picture is that Twitter initially 
offered broad access to its data and encouraged spinoff innovations, and restricted access later 
on, parallel to acquiring Tweetdeck (a dashboard app for managing Twitter accounts) and 
Gnip.98 
• Shortly before its launch in 2013, Twitter acquired Vine, a short-form video hosting service. New 
users of Vine could choose to follow their Facebook friends, a feature that was implemented 
through an API of Facebook. However, Facebook quickly shut down this type of access. Not 
much later, Instagram introduced ts own short-form video functionality, and in 2016 Vine quit the 
market.99 
• Running and cycling apps Strava and Relive used to complement each other. Strava is a social 
network for athletes that tracks speed, altitude and routes. The Dutch app Relive accessed this 
data to build a moving map. When the latter company introduced the feature to follow friends 
within its app, Strava terminated the data-sharing agreement100. 
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In the recent past, Facebook used to explicitly forbid close connections with (horizontally) 
competing social networks through its data access conditions101. The conditions said that a partner 
must not use Facebook to export user data into a competing social network without our permission, 
and that apps on Facebook may not integrate, link to, promote, distribute, or redirect to any app on 
competing social networks. The current version of these conditions no longer contains this 
restriction102. In 2018, Facebook reviewed its policy to block apps built on top of its platform that 
replicated its core functionality and decided to remove this policy103. 
 
For would-be competitors with a large user base, social networks may (wisely) choose not to 
foreclose them with access to data. Doing so would disappoint a large number of consumers. This 
may explain why Facebook maintained its social log-in agreement with Spotify. After signing in on a 
Facebook account in Spotify’s app, a user could send and receive messages (through Facebook) 
without leaving the app. This worked by using an API that provided Spotify with access to personal 
messages104. 
 
An important point related to the observations above is that platform owners will compare the 
substitution and complementary effects between their own apps and third-party apps. Independent 
developers, in particular smaller ones, tend to be at the receiving end of commercial agreements. 
Moreover, the impression is that existing (voluntary) data-sharing agreements tend to be vertical in 
nature. They are driven by mutual interests. The social network benefits from the complementary 
value that third parties bring to their ecosystem, or from more direct revenues from data. 
Independent developers benefit from the growth opportunities provided by an incumbent's user 
base and data, or from more direct opportunities to use data as a way to grab user attention. When 
business partners are active in the same arena as the platform (e.g. social interactions), they start 
to form a horizontal competitive threat which typically results in a termination of the agreement 
initiated by the social network. 
 
4.3.6 What is the impact of mandatory data sharing on innovation incentives? 
A general concern is that a mandatory data-sharing regime may lead to underinvestment in the 
collection and production of data, and that it undermines data-driven business models105. 
 
Horizontal data sharing 
Policy recommendations in the literature gravitate towards mandatory data portability as a means to 
reduce customer lock-in and increase customer mobility. A drawback of an obligation to provide 
portability is the reduced return on investment, which may affect incentives to innovate. For 
potential entrants, the efforts (including organisational adaptations and implementing legal 
safeguards) required to make data portable might be prohibitive in the first phase of their existence 
— say the first two years of the start-up phase. This can be overcome by granting newcomers a 
short exemption period. Note that one has to specify to which types of data obligations apply. As 
was already discussed, to stimulate consumer mobility it may make sense to focus on social data 
and user-generated content; although the effect may be limited – see reference above to Gans 
(2018). 
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It follows that there would have to be a substantial problem with horizontal competition to impose 
horizontal data sharing (assuming this intervention would be able to solve it). The presence of 
network effects signals that such problems could well be present, but the burden of proof is a 
hurdle, as demonstrated by market developments such as the fast emergence of social networks 
like Snapchat and TikTok, and the demise of the (nationally) established social network Hyves. 
Entrants would benefit from demand-side scale economies while there may not be a solid rationale 
in terms of helping them to overcome network barriers. 
 
Mandatory sharing of profile data is somewhat similar to number portability in telecommunications 
markets. Extending this parallel, would service interoperability be able to solve the problem of 
network effects, similar to the impact of network interconnection and interoperability requirements in 
telecoms? These obligations had the obvious purpose of helping entrants to overcome entry barrier 
caused by network effects. In digital markets, such as for social networks, the logic is different. 
These services are not inseparable from the underlying infrastructure, as used to be the case in 
telecommunications. The costs of switching and multi-homing are therefore much lower. Data 
portability in social networks may still contribute to the advancement of competition by facilitating 
multi-homing. However, multi-homing already is common so the need to mandate such measure is 
much less pressing. Therefore, the argument of helping entrants to overcome entry barriers is not 
immediately compelling for online services like social media. Note that this line of reasoning 
depends on how one views the relevant product market: what are relevant substitutes? For 
instance, does Facebook serve its own relevant market or does is compete with Reddit, Snapchat 
and so on? 
 
A drawback of mandatory data sharing is that such measures could interfere with innovation in 
business models of social networks, and of services that go beyond social media. They could also 
lock a market into a specific standard for data sharing for years to come. (Van Gorp N. , et al., 
2016) discuss this in the context of short messaging services (SMS). This telecoms service has, for 
good reasons, benefited from mandatory interconnection and interoperability. At the same time, 
however, the (legal and technical) requirements to conform to the legacy standard of SMS 
restricted the possibilities for future adaptations based on new technologies and business models, 




Vertical data-sharing concerns agreements between a social network and a third party, typically 
complementing each other. As long as there is no direct or anticipated competitive threat, parties 
will (or can be expected to) be willing to make voluntary agreements, because there is a mutual 
benefit106. One may ask though to what extent data will actually be shared, as there may be 
information asymmetries and uncertainty about the value. Also, for small third parties, an 
established social network calls the shots.107 Hence the question is whether additional 
requirements, most likely to the benefit of third parties, are desirable and what their impact on 
innovation is. 
 
Note that the social network will judge data-sharing requests on third parties' contribution to its 
ecosystem. In principle, the platform, in particular if it is not vertically integrated with firms similar to 
the third parties in question, will not want to harm them. Their success contributes to the social 
network's success. From a broader perspective though, one may want to evaluate data-sharing in 
the light of the merits for the whole market (or the economy). For instance, it may lead to spinoff 
innovations that are neutral to, or possibly harm, the platform's ecosystem, but generate value in 
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other settings that outweigh the impact on the social network. To come back to the question above: 
one has to compare the possible reduction in the platform's profitability (and innovation incentives) 
with the potential increase in third parties' initiatives to develop new business models, technologies, 
content and apps. 
 
What type of reasoning would be required to conclude that mandatory data-sharing is desirable? An 
assessment of the divergence of the social network's private incentives and the broader benefits 
from innovation is the starting point. Moreover, is there an asymmetric bargaining situation such 
that the social network may neglect the benefits from data-sharing that go beyond the value to its 
ecosystem? If so, the question is: what is the desirable scope for data access, in various 
dimensions such as the type of data, the timing (intermittent, delayed, real-time, live), the level of 
identification and tracking? As these questions require a very detailed analysis of business models 
and market characteristics, a more practical approach is more effective. We refer to the case on 
vertical exclusion for a further discussion. 
 
Overall 
Maintaining an API platform to provide data access (more broadly related to implementation, 
maintenance, and security) requires resources. It also exposes a firm to new risks, as data users 
may abuse the data which may reflect back on the platform. Therefore, for newcomers, it may not 
be a good idea to impose restrictions on them that hinder them in getting traction. A short 
exemption period (say two years) may solve this problem.  
 
4.3.7 What are the risks of data sharing? 
By sharing data with third parties, there is a risk that privacy and security protections get diluted. As 
a result, personal data may get compromised, resulting in harm to persons. They may include users 
of social networks, consumers of apps and people who are not users or consumers. The same may 
be true for the incentives to for compliance or perform audits on data partners (which are basically 
cost components, not revenue drivers). The more data is collected and shared, and the larger the 
number of device makers, app developers and ad companies who get access to data and perhaps 
store data on their own servers, the larger the privacy and security risks. 
 
Contractual requirements only go so far to reduce this risk, as illustrated by the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal: it can be difficult to control what happens to user data that has left a platform. 
Similarly, it may be hard to prevent that user data leaves user devices, for instance when a device 
synchronizes or backs up data to cloud services.  
 
4.3.8 What are the options under current legislation to make data sharing mandatory? 
Options under GDPR 
One of the purposes of the GDPR is to stimulate the free movement of personal data. It strengthens 
data subjects' control over personal data and impose duties on data controllers to restrict the 
collection and use of personal data. The GDPR contains a right to data portability that facilitates 
sharing and reuse of personal data at the request of the data subject. For instance, the regulation 
provides data subjects with the right to have personal data transmitted from one controller to 
another (if technically feasible), which constitutes a right to portability of one's personal data. Thus, 
current legislation allows for a restricted form of data sharing: data portability falls short of 
interoperability of social networks. More elaborate forms of data sharing, such as real-time 
portability might also be included under the GDPR's obligations (subject to technical feasibility), but 








Options related to abuses of dominance in competition law (including the essential facilities 
doctrine) 
Foreclosing access to data could, in certain situations, correspond to an abuse of a dominant 
position. This possibility is discussed in more detail in the case on vertical exclusion for an 
elaboration on this route to mandating data access.  
 
The essential facilities doctrine (EFD) is particularly relevant as it pertains to situations where a 
dominant company does not want to share data. Of course, one of the questions then is whether 
this data is "essential". The direct consequence of applying EFD would be to impose obligations to 
share the essential data. However, the options to apply the essential facilities doctrine seem to be 
limited, due to the difficulty (or impossibility) to satisfy the necessary conditions establishing the 
presence of a bottleneck. Exceptions may exist, but the burden of proof will in any case be very 
high, while the range of situations that correspond to a bottleneck situation is likely to be very 
narrow. 
 
Remedies resulting from the EFD are not ex ante, since they require an ex post assessment of an 
abuse. Still, once determined, obligations call for monitoring. Also, once implemented in a certain 
market, such remedies may incite players in other markets to share data, if only to avoid fines and 
liability. 
 
Note that in case of other forms of abuse (e.g. discrimination), data sharing obligations could also 
be used as a remedy, supposing it would solve the problem. 
 
Compatibility with the Database Directive and Trade Secrets Directive 
Data may be subject to intellectual property rights including copyright, sui generis (that is, unique) 
database protection and trade secret protection. These regimes might get in the way of data 
sharing. In response, invasions into intellectual property rights could be made proportional by  
balancing interests into data sharing measures.  
 
Copyrights may protect original content provided by users, such as posts and pictures on social 
networks. While users may hold copyrights over the content they upload, platforms often require 
users to give the provider a license to use this content, thus transferring users’ intellectual property 
rights. 
 
Sui generis database protection becomes relevant when a social network invests in obtaining, 
verifying or presenting pre-existing content (e.g. provided by users). However, it only applies to the 
database (the structuring of the data), not to the data itself. 
 
Trade secret protection may also apply, conditional on data being secret, that secrecy renders it 
commercially valuable, while efforts have been made to keep it secret. If a social network 
processes user data to make targeted advertising possible, it may be the case that secrecy makes 
such advertising more profitable. For example, knowing what type of data feeds the algorithm may 
(in theory) reveal information about how the algorithm operates. 
 
Thus, there are various layers of protection that may apply, and they are not necessarily compatible 
with each other. For instance, if user A takes a picture of user B, then A has a copyright while the 
picture contains personal data about B. When posted on Facebook, the picture becomes part of the 
database protection applying to the platform's data structure. The various layers may, at some 
point, come into conflict with each other. 
 
An example illustrating that social networks indeed invoke trade secrets and other intellectual 







data protection activist) and Facebook regarding his right to access his social network data. 
Facebook did not provide access to all personal data in response to the Schrems’ requests for 
access in 2011. As justification, the social network provider referred to one of the sections of the 
Irish Data Protection Acts (as applicable to Facebook because of its Irish headquarters) that ‘carves 
out an exception to subject access requests where the disclosures in response would adversely 
affect trade secrets or intellectual property’108. This also shows that data protection rights, such as 
the right to access personal data but also the right to data portability, may clash with the intellectual 
property rights held by data controllers. To solve this conflict, the two rights will need to be balanced 
against each other. 
 
4.3.9 What are other options for stimulating data sharing? 
Since the risks associated with data sharing (and mandating it) depend on case-specific 
characteristics as well as the nature and scope of data-sharing, it makes sense to try to identify no-
regret policies. At first sight, a narrow set of obligations might apply to (i) data about individual 
behaviour and social interactions, and (ii) the social graph. Not so much with the purpose of 
realising full services interoperability, but to inject some convenience with regard to cross-network 
interactions. It is an open question if that would be worth the effort, as a priori there is not an 
immediate case supporting that data forms a substantial entry barrier, or that data access 
eliminates an entry barrier. 
 
Data pooling arrangements such as the Data Transfer Project (DTP) of the big tech firms as well as 
some smaller companies could stimulate data mobility. The scope of such projects determines the 
scope of data sharing that it facilitates: does it merely aim at access to and portability of personal 
data subject to a common standard, or does it have full-service interoperability as a goal? OECD 
(2019) mentions as its use cases: data portability between services, trying out new services, and 
backing up data. DTP seems to gravitate around porting data. 
 
To achieve a higher degree of interoperability (assuming it would be desirable), one probably needs 
a more elaborate common data format. It would have to enables “syntactic” compatibility (such that 
the target system can decode received data) as well as “semantic” compatibility (such that the 
target system also understands data)109. 
 
One may consider imposing restrictions on API access by regulating which types of restrictions 
companies may impose on this type of access. This could reduce situations in which social 
networks "arbitrarily" block downstream firms from data access. 
  
                                                          
108  E. Protalinski, ’Facebook: Releasing your personal data reveals our trade secrets’, ZD Net, 12 October 2011, available at 
https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-releasing-your-personal-data-reveals-our-trade-secrets/ . 







5 Case: banking 
5.1 Case description 
This case explores the impact on the banking sector of the asymmetric data sharing obligation for 
banks (PSD2). The case analyses the provision of financial services by Big Tech firms110, its 
drivers, the resulting benefits, and its implications for competition and innovation. In doing so, it 
draws on examples from specific firms. The hypothesis is as follows: due to an absence of 
reciprocity in data sharing there is an unlevel playing field between traditional financial service 
providers on the one hand and the big tech companies on the other. 
 
We test this hypothesis in a legal and practical (business economics) dimension. Therefore, the 
case consists of: 
• a legal analysis of the degree to which tech companies are allowed to combine banking data 
with other (non-financial personal) data, and of the degree to which banks are allowed to 
combine these data types; and 
• a factual analysis of the types of data with which financial banking data is combined by big tech 
companies and whether banks (can) have access to the same non-financial personal data used 
by tech companies. 
 
If differences exist, the purpose of the case is to illustrate, with recent product innovations, that the 
competitiveness of banks is indeed hampered by the asymmetric treatment and not for other 
reasons (for example, by a rigidity of banks to adjust their business model). If the hypothesis is 
confirmed, a central question is whether reciprocity in data sharing obligations could restore the 
playing field, how one should scope and enforce such reciprocity requirements. 
 
This case pertains to different types of data sharing between providers in different markets and of 
data obtained through different services. This does not necessarily refer to cross-sectoral data 
sharing. The latter term can be confusing. The fact that PSD2 provides outsiders with access to 
banking data does not amount to cross-sectoral data sharing, because these outsiders use the data 
to enter the banking sector (which contributes to horizontal competition). Cross-sectoral data 
sharing involves sharing of data with sectors other than those where the data is being collected. If 
banks would get access to data from other sectors, for instance data from tech firms, there would 
be cross-sectoral data sharing.  
 
 
5.2 Analysis of research questions 
5.2.1 Which role does data play in the business model, and what are the benefits that data provide? 
Financial firms generate revenues from banking transactions and other financial services related to 
consumer banking, commercial banking, investment banking, and asset & wealth management. In 
contrast, some of the Big Tech firms generate revenues primarily from collecting and monetizing 
data, or from selling hardware, software and related IT services. What drives then the motivation of 
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Big Tech firms to expand into financial services? The firms themselves argue that this is mainly to 
improve customer satisfaction and offer convenience to their customers.111   
 
According to commentators in the Banking Industry112, Big Tech firms have expanded into financial 
services for three main reasons. First, offering financial services allows them to diversify their 
business and opens new revenue opportunities. Second, the provision of financial services enables 
Big Tech firms to provide higher levels of customer experience to their end-users by integrating 
financial services into their existing platforms, thereby also increasing revenues from their core 
businesses. Third, offering payment or account information services allows Big Tech firms to collect 
additional data on the spending habits and financial positions of their customers.  
 
Looking at it from a strategic angle, some Big Tech companies offer financial services as part of 
their super-app or single-ecosystem strategies.113 As part of such a strategy, they are trying to 
make their app a central part of their customers’ life and moving beyond search, social media, 
eCommerce, or ride-sharing activities. With this strategy, they aim to reduce frictions and deliver 
hyper-personalized, superb experiences that consumers find helpful.114  
 
Banks and financial service providers also understand the importance of data. Financial Service 
Providers collect customer-provided data and observe transactional data about their clients. The 
banks collect customer-provided data through applications for checking accounts, credit cards, 
loans, and mortgages. This data may include salary payments, annual income information, 
employer details, or other data elements. In addition, banks also observe transactional data while 
capturing the customers’ activities. Accessing other data (hereafter referred to as “non-traditional 
data”) is not regulated; they may be observed by the banks or obtained, either bought or freely 
accessed, from third parties.  
 
The banking industry is among the most data-driven industries, and firms are leveraging big data 
and already employ advanced analytics to grow their business. According to McKinsey, big data 
can generate more value to financial institutions in three ways. First, it can boost traditional Profit & 
Loss levels by accelerating growth, enhancing productivity, and improving risk control. Second, it 
can help them to find new business models and new sources of growth. Third, it can improve the 
customer experience by gathering real-time data and using analytics to understand the customer 
and build the proper customer journey.115  
 
When we contrast these motives with those of the Big Techs, we must realize that the motives are 
very similar. Data is used by both the Big Tech firms and the Banks to (i) improve the P&L of their 
legacy core business, (ii) build a better customer experience, and (iii) find new businesses and 
business models. 
 
The Big Tech’s move into the domain of financial services does not in itself result in level playing 
field issues. The potential issue is their first mover’s advantage in building “Super Apps”.116 The key 
advantage of the Big Tech’s is their legacy market position and data access advantage to build 
better customer engagement and the capability of offering superior services using their super-app 
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platforms. Even if traditional financial service providers would be allowed to broaden the scope of 
their services and gain access to Big Tech data, it is highly unlikely that they can build super apps 
that can effectively compete with those of Big Techs. We shall also add to this that user experience 
(UX) is critical to market success in the platform economy, and hyper-personalization plays an 
important role in the UX design. Larger, more extensive data sets can be used to drive better 
insights and better insights can lead to better UX design. This itself, in addition to their first mover’s 
position in building super-apps, may create another advantage for the Big Techs.  Even if banks get 
a chance to access non-traditional data of selected customers, they would not have access to non-
traditional data of customers on their Serviceable Available Market (SAM), therefore, they could 
likely not match the UX that Big Tech’s are capable to offering to their end customers.  
 
5.2.2 Which data and types of data are indispensable?  
Regarding cross-sectoral data sharing from Big Tech firms to financial service providers, it is hard 
to define what data and data types would be indispensable for the business model. 
 
It is straightforward to define what data is necessary for the provision of given financial services. 
Indispensable data in this context means data that is needed for payment related services or for 
account information services offered by e.g. Big Tech firms. According to PSD2, banks must 
provide ‘all information on the initiation of the payment transaction and all information accessible to 
the account servicing payment service provider regarding the execution of the payment 
transaction117’. Note that Big Tech firms can request all essential information from the financial 
service provider, but only with the consent of the end-user. In the case of payment services, the 
needed data is minimal. Here, one can think of data related to the identification of the customer and 
data associated with the particular payment transaction (e.g., the transaction amount, time stamp, 
location identifier, and confirmation if sufficient funds are available to complete the transaction). In 
the case of account information services, the data exchange is more extensive, but the exact data 
content is more ambiguous. Banks will need to provide all information related to the account 
information service. This information will include data associated with the identification of the 
customer, account history, information about other accounts, account balances, and any other data 
that is collected by the bank and is available to the end-users when they would log into their 
respective accounts. For payment transactions and account information services, this type of data 
access is enabled by PSD2. Derived and implied information, which is not available to end-users 
but might be used by the bank for customer analyses or other assessments, are not covered and 
currently there is no obligation for Banks to share them. 
 
The nature of indispensable data is different for banks. The primary reason why they want to get 
access to non-traditional data is not to develop services outside of the financial services market but 
to enhance their core activities: enhance productivity, improve risk control, and enhance the 
customer experience. One can argue that obtaining non-traditional data is “indispensable” for 
Banks to provide traditional banking services, so they can get the efficiency and quality required in 
the digital age. In this context, non-traditional data is important to improve their efficiency and to 
withstand the increased competitive pressures from (Big)Techs, but it is not “indispensable” for the 
provision of traditional banking services.118 
 
                                                          
117  PSD2, Art 66, 4.b. 
118  Banks do not develop services outside of the financial services market. In certain jurisdictions, Banks are not allowed to go 
into non-banking activities. In other jurisdictions, they could go into certain non-banking activities, however doing it would 
be very costly for them due to banking regulations (financial stability, prudential banking) and compliance requirements, 








By way of illustration, let us consider the example of lending. Traditionally, players in the financial 
industry assess consumers’ creditworthiness based on their financial history.119 An increasing 
number of lenders now also rely on non-traditional data to assess credit risk. For example, Lenddo 
assigns credit scores based on information in users’ social networking profiles (with their 
permission). This information includes education and employment history, how many followers they 
have, who they are friends with, and information about those friends (Rusli, 2013). Rusli’s research 
also implies that an individual’s credit assessment is likely to be affected by the creditworthiness of 
his or her most relevant social media contacts. Bertrand and Kamenica (2018) show that owning an 
Apple iOS device is one of the best predictors for being in the top quartile of the income distribution. 
Gambacorta et al. (2019) found that financial models based on machine learning and non-
traditional data are better able to predict losses and defaults than traditional models in the presence 
of a negative shock to the aggregate credit supply.  
 
These findings suggest that credit scoring models based on machine learning and non-traditional 
financial data used by the Big Tech firms are better able to predict borrowers’ losses and defaults 
than traditional empirical models alone. Although Ruiz et al. (2019) argues that a digital footprint120 
complements rather than substitutes for traditional credit bureau information, it is logical to reach 
the conclusion that analysing both traditional and non-traditional data will predict defaults better 
than analysing only one of them.   
 
Payment services and Account Information Services allow Big Tech firms to collect information 
about the payment history of individuals. This data access is far-reaching because recent research 
suggests that cash-flow details provide a more detailed and timelier picture of how applicants 
manage their finances than traditional credit reports. When this cash-flow information is combined 
with other data collected about end-users (the digital footprint), Big Techs might be better 
positioned to develop risk models than relying solely on financial data or only on the digital footprint. 
Having access to spending habits and financial situation may also improve the accuracy of their 
customer profiling and allow them to increase revenues in their core businesses. If the combination 
of financial information with digital footprints yields superior information on predicting defaults, then 
Big Techs firms may challenge the traditional financial institutions based on an information 
advantage, rather than on merits (alone).   
 
5.2.3 Can access to indispensable data facilitate entry or strengthen competition? 
Access to banking data under PSD2 certainly helps to facilitate market entry. Big Tech firms have 
applied for PSD2 licenses and they can offer financial services. This may intensify competition in 
the financial sector. However, some argue that when Big Tech firms’ access banking data, this may 
ultimately weaken competition in financial services, given their ability to tip markets. However, even 
when Big Techs were to conquer the market for financial services, we note that the nature of 
competition between Big Tech companies is inherently more dynamic then the competition between 
banks. As such, it remains to be seen whether the net effect of entry by Big Tech companies is 
good or bad for consumers. 
 
According to some sources, the rationale of PSD2 regulation is viewed as pro-competitive: the 
business case of new entrants who want to provide online payment-related services largely 
depends on the availability of customers’ account data. Because the latter is at the sole disposal of 
incumbents, and due to limited competition upstream, banks do not have sufficient incentives to 
share consumer data with downstream companies. The obligation outlined in Art. 36 of PDS2 aims 
                                                          
119  The FICO score, for example, uses data from five categories, namely payment history (35%), amounts owed (30%), length 
of credit history (15%), new credit (10%) and credit mix (10%). See https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/credit-
scores/whats-not-in-your-credit-score 
120  Ruiz et al. (2019) used the following ten variables to define digital footprint: digital device type, device operating system, 
host name of the email provider, channel, transaction time, do not track settings, name in the email, number in the email, 







at preventing banks from refusing “to let qualified third parties access customer’s account data 
despite the latter’s consent”, and therefore to foster competition (Porto & Ghidini, 2020).  
 
In contrast, running commercial platforms and providing payment services allows Big Tech firms to 
accumulate a broader set of information on the merchants’ turnover and scale of business as well 
as to make better judgment on their financial soundness (broader and better compared to traditional 
financial service providers). They can also accumulate broader information on an individual’s 
financial position. These make it possible for the Big Tech firms to step into the lending business 
providing superior lending to small and medium-sized firms as well as to end-users. According to 
other research, within a few years, Big Tech companies will be able to succeed in overtaking the 
origination and distribution of loans to consumers and SMEs. Mano and Padilla (2018) argue that 
this may ultimately harm competition, reduce consumer welfare, and bring an increased risk of 
financial instability in the medium or long term. Mano and Padilla thus argue that the current 
oligopoly of a few banks is replaced by an even worse performing oligopoly of a few global Big 
Tech companies. However, one may argue that the global Big Tech companies are not competing 
in a traditional oligopolistic market, but in highly dynamic moligopolistic market. The conclusion that 
consumers will be worse off will then be debatable.  
 
In theory, however, the competitive process in the banking sector may benefit from reciprocity in 
data sharing regardless of the scenario being played out. The question is whether this is also 
practical and what are the costs in terms of privacy and incentives to innovate?  
 
5.2.4 Are there bottlenecks for accessing data? 
Given existing PSD2 regulations (European Commission, 2015), there are no bottlenecks for the 
Big Tech firms to access data related to customers’ accounts at banks. Therefore, at present, there 
are no bottlenecks for the Big Techs for accessing essential data for the provision of financial 
services (under PSD2). Under this regulation, Big Techs are not required to make non-traditional 
data available to banks that can complement the banks’ financial services. Under the GDPR, 
however, platform users may instruct platforms to share data with their banks. Furthermore, banks 
and financial institutions can also obtain non-traditional data elsewhere, and they do. Banks have 
long realized that non-traditional data, when combined with traditional data and analytics, can 
improve the acquisition and retention of clients, and it allows for cross-selling and upselling.121  As a 
result, financial industry players collect non-traditional data via the Internet and mobile networks, 
obtain data from IoT devices, swipe cards, ATMs, card readers, and sensors. They can observe 
non-traditional data directly and also get non-traditional data from Big Tech firms and other third-
party data suppliers.  
 
Banks and financial institutions cannot, however, access “all” Big Tech data. There are a few 
examples when Big Tech platforms decided not to grant financial institutions access to their data for 
fear of negative side-effects on their own core business. For example, Facebook blocked one of the 
UK’s biggest insurers, Admiral Insurance, from using its user data. This insurance company wanted 
to use social data for risk profiling and to set insurance premiums accordingly.122 Facebook blocked 
data access claiming that they protect the privacy of its users, and with such profiling, Admiral 
                                                          
121  For example, McKinsey (2019) cites an example of a bank using credit-card transactional data “to develop offers that gave 
customers incentives to make regular purchases from one of the bank’s merchants”.  See 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/analytics-in-banking-time-to-realize-the-value 
122  Admiral Insurance wanted to identify personality traits through examining posts and likes of Facebook users. The 
insurance company would identify users “who write in short, concise sentences, use lists, and arrange to meet friends at a 
set time and place, rather than just “tonight”, would be identified as conscientious. In contrast, those who frequently use 









Insurance would violate Facebook’s platform policy.123  A privacy issue is that Facebook users may 
find it challenging to opt out because the financial disadvantage in doing so becomes so significant 
that they have no other option but to grant the insurance company access to their data. Another 
problem is the adverse selection being leveraged into the platform. High-risk clients would be less 
inclined to join (or actively use) the social network to escape the risk premium that the insurer would 
otherwise apply to them.  
 
Big Tech firms have better, more exhaustive access to non-traditional data (e.g., social media 
relationship, behavioural profiles) than banks, due to their own market activity. Therefore, using the 
previous example of lending, Big Tech firms are likely able to better predict borrowers’ losses and 
defaults than traditional financial institutions. These data become increasingly important for banks 
to withstand the growing competitive pressure from Big Techs in the provision of financial services. 
Not having access to the Big Tech data might create a competitive disadvantage to banks 
regarding certain financial services. Possibly, banks are forced to focus on providing some core 
functions in the financial system and leave specific services to others. In such scenario, banks 
would face similar challenges as telecom operators who have also been forced by Big Techs to 
focus their activities on the provision a key infrastructural service. Such development implies a 
certain degree of commoditisation of the services that banks offer.  
 
5.2.5 Is data currently being shared (voluntarily, on a commercial basis)? 
Banks can collect a lot of non-traditional data directly or buy them from third parties; they do not 
need have a data-sharing agreement with Big Tech firms.  
 
Not all commercial agreements are in the public domain. Still, at the time of writing, we are not 
aware that personalized data on search (queries and clicking behaviour) or detailed data on social 
network relationships would be directly accessible to financial institutions, even with customer 
consent.124 Big Tech firms, however, did create data-sharing agreements with third parties 
(developers), to support apps that run on their platforms. Banking and financial services apps have 
access to the same Big Tech firms' data, under the same terms and conditions as other app 
developers.125  There are a few examples, however, where Big Tech data is mined and used to 
gain insights. Kabbage, for instance, provides small businesses with an automated line of credit. 
Kabbage automates its credit decisions based on several data factors, including business volume, 
time in business, transaction volume, social media activity, owner’s credit score.126 
 
Essential data from Banks to Big Tech firms are shared under PSD2.127 At the time of writing, we 
are not aware that banking data outside of PSD2 would be available to Big Tech firms (and existing 
banking regulations would not even allow for such data exchange). For limited sharing of banking 
data on a commercial basis, we can mention certain partnership agreements between Big Tech 
firms and banks where the primary nature of the deal is not related to the data, but a limited data 
exchange must take place to fulfil the agreement. One such example could be Amazon’s 
                                                          
123  Facebook’s Platform Policy (3.15) states that developers cannot "use data obtained from Facebook to make decisions 
about eligibility, including whether to approve or reject an application or how much interest to charge on a loan." See 
https://developers.facebook.com/policy/ 
124  Article 6(1)(b) of the GDPR would allow the combination of personal data held by the BigTech firm with the traditional 
financial information of the bank, but we are not aware of commercial data exchange of this type. 
125  For terms and conditions to access data, for example, you can visit: https://developers.google.com/terms/api-services-
user-data-policy (Google), https://developer.linkedin.com/docs/rest-api (LinkedIn), or 
https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/using-graph-api (Facebook). 
126  https://www.valuepenguin.com/small-business/kabbage-business-loan-review 








partnership with Bank of America for its lending program,128 or Google’s partnership with Citigroup 
and Stanford Federal Credit Union to offer checking accounts.129 
 
5.2.6 What is the impact of mandatory data sharing on innovation incentives? 
Regarding data sharing by banks under PSD2, there will be no impact, because the data involved is 
typically observed/provided and can be regarded a by-product of providing financial services. A 
possible obligation for Big Tech firms to share data may not necessarily affect their incentives to 
invest in producing these data, provided it only concerns data that was provided to or observed by 
them, and not the data which was inferred or derived from these data. 
 
The entry of technology-focused firms into financial services offers innovation and social benefits. 
The benefits include possible reductions in the cost of financial services for consumers, both at the 
retail and institutional level, through improved efficiencies. Customers will be able to access 
financial products that are cheaper, more convenient, tailored, and accessible.  
 
PSD2 created incentives for the Big Techs to develop new, innovative services because their 
services are typically delivered through a platform already used extensively by the customer. Big 
Tech firms may also improve financial inclusion and facilitate access to markets that were 
previously untapped, a particularly important benefit for the unbanked population and a large 
portion of SMEs.130 
 
Banks argue, however, that PSD2 introduced asymmetric regulation and that the mandatory and 
asymmetric data sharing between financial service providers and Big Tech companies could cut off 
part of the banks’ current revenue stream, decrease their profit margin, and ultimately lower the 
banks’ incentives for innovation. Reciprocity in data sharing would ensure that Big Techs and banks 
would compete on a level playing field.  
 
Big Techs' position is that such an asymmetry does not exist, Banks today can obtain all essential 
information to offer their financial services. They also argue that a mandatory data sharing regime 
could possibly lead to underinvestment in data monetization and undermine data-driven business 
models.    
 
5.2.7 What are the risks of data sharing? 
The financial services sector handles sensitive information about individuals and enterprises. With 
the digital transformation in the finance sector, more and more customer-provided data is available 
in digital formats, and more and more information is observed during transactions. Combining big 
data sets makes it easier to generate insights but also makes the data more susceptible to security 
breaches. Also, the combination of large data sets, even if the data is de-anonymized, has the 
potential to privacy vulnerabilities.131 Because of this, security and privacy vulnerabilities are threats 
to the rise of big data solutions in the finance sector.  
 
Consumers may benefit from data sharing, but data ubiquity, and consequently, data security, are 
proving to be a significant challenge for banks and Big Tech firms alike. The more data is collected 
                                                          
128  In this deal, Bank of America is providing capital for Amazon Lending and the primary reason for the deal agreement was 
not to exchange banking data. See https://www.americanbanker.com/slideshow/how-amazon-is-shaking-up-financial-
services 
129  See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-finance/google-pay-to-offer-checking-accounts-through-citi-stanford-federal-
idUSKBN1XN1IQ 
130  Big Tech firms’ such offerings are on markets which are typically outside of the European Union.  
131  Data sets that are anonymized can often be de-anynomized. De-anonymization is the practice of matching anonymous 








and shared, and the larger the number of participants in the data sharing process, the more 
significant the security and privacy risks. 
 
Of course, the risks of data sharing can be managed. Banks already must comply with strict 
regulations for safeguarding people’s privacy and the integrity of the retail payment infrastructure, 
and they have a good track record in doing so. Big Tech firms also have gained ample knowledge 
and experience to handle data security, privacy, and compliance requirements by design.132 
 
5.2.8 What are the options under current legislation (general and sector-specific) to make data sharing 
mandatory? 
The question for this specific case is not the data sharing, but if (and how) reciprocity might be 
reached. PSD2 already allows for data sharing from the finance firms to Big Techs.  
• According to Article 36 of the PSD2 Directive, Payment Initiation Services Providers (PISPs) 
and Account Information Services Providers (AISP) have a right to freely access their 
customers’ accounts data, under the same customer’s consent to provide payment services or 
account information services. 
• According to Article 31 of the Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS), banks shall comply with 
each of the following requirements:  
- they shall provide account information service providers with the same information from 
designated payment accounts and associated payment transactions made available to the 
payment service user when directly requesting access to the account information;  
- they shall provide payment initiation service providers with the same information on the 
initiation and execution of the payment transaction provided or made available to the 
payment service user when the transaction is initiated directly by the latter;  
- they shall provide payment service providers with a confirmation whether the amount 
necessary for the execution of a payment transaction is available on the payment account of 
the payer.  
 
Big Techs collect personal data about individuals, and this personal data could be ported to Banks 
and Financial Service providers using GDPR provisions and with the users’ consent.  
 
So, the argument that the PSD2’s data sharing obligations are asymmetric, and that this asymmetry 
harms the competitive position of banks vis-à-vis Big Techs, is not entirely valid. This does not 
mean, however, there is no asymmetry at all, but this does not relate to data sharing. Currently, 
new business activities of the banks are subject to the same regulations as their traditional banking 
activities. Therefore, as they argue, banks do not compete with new entrants on the same rules and 
same terms, A possible solution lies in the notion of "activity-based regulation" that poses fewer 
restrictions on banks that want to innovate. Currently, new business activities of the banks are 
under the same stringent regulatory requirements as the traditional business activities. Therefore, 
as they argue, banks do not compete with new entrants on the same rules and same terms.133, 134 
 
Banks are in favour of cross-sectoral data-sharing based on a mix of GDPR and PSD2. A problem 
with GDPR is that there is no imposed format for the data exchange, nor are there specific 
requirements and conditions for real-time data transfers. The existing GDPR regulation could be 
amended (maybe in the form of a domain-specific Regulatory Technical Standard) that addresses 
the challenges of continuous mechanisms for such (near real-time) data exchange. A non-domain 
                                                          
132  For more details, for example, how Google addresses the requirements of the finance industry, See 
https://cloud.google.com/security/compliance/financial-services  
133  ING argues for the principle of “same services, same risks, same rules”. See https://www.ing.com/About-us/Regulatory-
international-affairs/Viewpoints/Financial-innovation-and-licensing.htm 
134  It is also worth noting that the activities of Big Tech firms in financial services may be subject to regulation in certain 
jurisdictions. Similarly, there are other jurisdictions where the legal framework prohibits deposit-taking banks, or their 







specific amendment to the GDPR could also be introduced with that applies to all sectors (banking 
and non-banking), with real-time access through APIs, and standardized. 
 
5.2.9 Policy options 
There are two fundamentally different models for how reciprocal access might be addressed. The 
first model is to introduce data sharing requirements only within the domain of financial services 
and only between intra-industry participants. This model would assume Big Tech firms would be 
required to separate their activities in the financial markets from their other businesses. In this 
model, the Big Tech firms would be allowed to enter the financial services market via a structurally 
separated entity (which would not be allowed to share the obtained data with other entities), and 
they would need to provide data access to the incumbent banks and other financial services 
providers in the same terms. With such structural separation, Big Tech firms themselves would not 
offer financial services and they could stay neutral to all players in the financial industry.  
 
The second model would be opening data sharing requirements to non-industry participants. This 
model would address cross-sector data exchange. The raw data held by companies in all industries 
would be accessible by any firm on similar terms and conditions, upon the request of an end-
customer. Banks would have to make traditional data accessible to non-industry players. In 
contrast, other companies would have to do the same with their raw data. This would enable the 
end-users to manage full access to their personal data to any firm and take advantage of advanced 
product offerings from companies across many industries.135 
 
The first model is easier to implement. The second model is more difficult as it requires coordination 
amongst several regulatory bodies across many sectors in many countries. One would also have to 
explore the technical feasibility (and possibly the delineation) with regard to the sharing of raw data. 
For both models to work, it would be desired to come-up with regulation at the EU level not to 
create fragmented regulatory instruments and to avoid regulatory shopping.136  
 
From a purely technical point of view, reciprocity in data exchange can be achieved in either model 
and in various ways. For example, in return for getting access to the financial data of a particular 
customer, Big Techs could be required to make all raw customer data available to the Banks, in 
real-time. Alternatively, while providing financial services, Big Techs could be prohibited to combine 
financial data with personal data that they uniquely have about the particular customer. Technical 
feasibility, however, does not mean that it is worthwhile to implement reciprocity in practice. The 
main reason for this is that, currently, there are no guarantees that the cost of implementing 
reciprocity in data exchange would outweigh its perceived benefits considering the banking sector 
alone. Providing ultra-fast access to real-time big data has its implementation costs, and it is not 
simple to define reciprocity rules that do not leave much room for interpretation by lawyers in 
various jurisdictions, and simple to verify compliance. A level playing field in the domain of financial 
services is primarily not driven by the lack of reciprocal data access but by the lack of same rules 
for the same services. Big Techs do not fall under the same regulatory and supervisory 
requirements as banks, therefore, implementing reciprocal data access will, in itself, not create a 
level playing field and may introduce possible negative side effects related to privacy and data 
security risks due to potentially ambiguous data exchange obligations. While there may be good 
reasons for regulatory differentiation between banks and Big Techs, it is beyond the scope of this 
study to evaluate these reasons. 
 
                                                          
135  Institute of International Finance: “Reciprocity in Customer Data Sharing Frameworks”. See 
https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/32370132_reciprocity_in_customer_data_sharing_frameworks_20170730.pdf 
136  The supervision of banking, payments, and e-money institutions are rather fragmented in the European Union. Banking 
regulation resides at the EU level, while payments and e-money institutions are nationally licensed and supervised. This 







Rather than drafting new rules on reciprocity, the same effect can to large extent be realised on the 
basis of PSD2 and GDPR. However, in practice users (still) tend to be hesitant to instruct a bank 
and a platform to exchange data, which may be a sign of lack of trust. To overcome this barrier, the 
creation of a trusted (digital) environment for data sharing may help. ‘Trusted’ in this context means, 
among other things, that there are transparent and non-discriminatory rules for data exchange. In 
this trusted environment, the data access is transparently monitored, and rule violations need to be 
prevented. The rules shall allow parties to benefit from data sharing without experiencing negative 
consequences. This requires control by those involved about who has access to data that can be 
traced back to the data subject (person or company). The platform must also be based on a robust 
and reliable infrastructure that guarantees continuity and security. Simply imposing a law that 
obligates data sharing does not create such a trusted environment, nor does it create the technical 
standards for data exchange. This is something that must come from the market or driven by the 











6 Case: administrative business software 
6.1 Case description 
This case zooms in on possibilities for and potential effects of data sharing between companies in 
the market for administrative business software. The market for business software developers is 
characterized by a comparatively small group of software developers, such as Oracle, Microsoft, 
SAP and AWS, that is capable of developing and hosting complex, large-scale software 
infrastructures for large corporations and public authorities at national and decentralized levels of 
government. The complexity and scale of these systems originates from the need for integration of 
various databases, applications and cloud services, often supplemented with specialized solutions 
from smaller-scale developers that can run on the infrastructure of the leading developers. 
Alternatively, a supplier may provide both the data infrastructure and the key administrative 
functionalities, in an integrated software system (still, in such cases, the application may have to be 
able to work together with software from other suppliers). Important parameters are the 
interoperability of autonomous systems, as well as the possibility of interaction and data sharing 
between them, called data portability. 
 
The role of data in the case of business software 
As in the other cases, data represents a core function in the market for business software. However, its 
role is fundamentally different in this case: data is a key input for the users of the administrative software. 
Relevant types of data cover all administered information from both internal and external processes and 
operations. Software providers control access to that data by managing the infrastructure in 
which organisations structure and analyse the data retrieved from their portfolio of data sets and 
applications. Efficient use by the business users is facilitated through uninterrupted data portability and 
interoperability between solutions of various software suppliers. New solutions built upon the legacy 
software of a software infrastructure provider increase efficiency of the comprehensive network of 
applications and databases, facilitating economic benefit, such as synergies, more efficient internal 
processes, better informed decision-making, and increased innovation. 
 
Business software users’ operations can become dependent on their software infrastructure, which 
can, in turn, create a certain dependency on the provider of the software running on top. 
Dependency can frustrate the optimal functioning of an organisation’s software infrastructure, 
especially when it limits the flexibility to integrate software applications of other developers to the 
infrastructure through data portability and interoperability. Predominantly, this occurs in a horizontal 
setting between providers of similar software, to the extent where users cannot (easily) cut the core 
supplier out or change to a competitor (‘vendor lock-in').   
 
The development, implementation and maintenance of data portability between solutions is a 
valuable part of software suppliers’ business model, while the costs and risks involved with 
switching software suppliers enables existing suppliers to raise prices. As a result, suppliers can 
create significant barriers for switching between software providers and for alternative software 
providers to enter the market.  
 
Therefore, this case explores the relationship between (limitations in) data portability and lock-in 
effects in the market for enterprise software. Since there may be a range of causes that make it 
hard for customers to switch to another provider, some of them not related to data, a key question 
is to what extent voluntary or mandatory horizontal data sharing (through data portability) can 







on competition and innovation in the market for business software. It is not clear to what extent data 
portability (alone) could lower the barriers for switching and entry, nor is its impact on the need for 
acquiring expert knowledge for implementation and maintenance of new business software. This 
depends largely on its ability to circumvent legal licensing issues and technical legacy software 
issues, as well as what the involved costs would be.  
 
 
6.2 Preliminary analysis 
6.2.1 The market for business software 
Demand side 
The deployment of information technology (IT) products and services by governments and 
businesses have shown steady growth over the last decades. Figures on investment and 
maintenance costs in Table 6.1 underline this development. Especially the size and growth rate of 
investment costs for software stand out, compared to hardware and electronic networks in 2005, 
2011 and 2017. Costs for intermediary utilization services, such as maintenance, show a similar 
growing trend in the reference period. The size and increase of IT investment led to studies on its 
drivers and on possibilities for cost containment and efficiencies. 
 
Table 6.1: Overview of IT investment and maintenance costs in 2005, 2011 and 2017. 
 Category 2005 2011 2017 
IT investment costs by 
businesses and governments 
Hardware € 3.7 bln € 3.8 bln € 4.1 bln 
Software € 10.8 bln € 15.1 bln € 21.7 bln 
Electronic networks € 1.9 bln € 2.0 bln € 2.8 bln 
Total € 16.4 bln € 20.9 bln € 28.7 bln 
IT intermediary utilization* by 
businesses and governments 
IT products & services € 28.7 bln € 33.1 bln € 51.2 bln 
Source: CBS reports ‘ICT, kennis en economie 2016’ and ‘ICT, kennis en economie 2019’. 
 
For a part of the market, the demand for IT solutions is characterised by needs for flexibility and 
customisation. This drives the reliance of governments and businesses on external expertise.137 
The use of external expertise is relatively costly, and results from ongoing shortages of skilled in-
house software experts. The shortage of skilled labour in software used to be predominantly an 
issue for public institutions138, who could not compete with labour conditions offered by private 
parties. As a result, governments lacked in-house knowledge and experience, and had to outsource 
the development and maintenance of administrative software to specialized, private companies. 
The described deficiency is not restricted to government anymore; today, private businesses report 
similar problems in attracting sufficient software professionals.139 
 
Supply side 
With the rising demand for business software solutions, the supply side of the market has matured 
over the last decades. Globally, there are conservatively tens of thousands of business software 
vendors of all sorts of solutions, while for each solution there are many differentiated alternatives 
which compete to offer that combination of features and functionality that customers will want to 
                                                          
137  Ollongren, K. (2019). Toelichting op toename externe inhuur (ICT) personeel Rijk. Letter of government. Available at: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2019/07/02/kamerbrief-over-toename-externe-inhuur-ict-
personeel-rijk 
138  Algemene Rekenkamer. (2019). Rijksoverheid heeft informatiebeveiliging en IT beheer nog niet op orde. Available at: 
https://www.rekenkamer.nl/actueel/nieuws/2019/05/15/rijksoverheid-heeft-informatiebeveiliging-en-it-beheer-nog-niet-op-
orde 








choose. Moreover, with the advent of the public cloud, increasingly more organisations are - 
constructing their own enterprise software solutions.  
 
At a first glance, the market for business software consists of a diverse and sizeable group of 
software providers. It is, however, important to distinguish providers at a more granular level. A 
crucial development is the shift of the business software market to a more cloud-based 
environment. Traditional and offline IT systems are supplemented with, or in some cases replaced 
by, cloud business services. Generally, the most accurate distinction is made through a division in 
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Software-as-a-Service 
(SaaS). These classifications each offer a progressive layer of abstraction on top of traditional IT 
environments, where all products and services were managed by the end user. 
 
 
Source: IBM. (2020). IaaS. Available at: https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/iaas#toc-iaas-vs-pa-w12c-z4b 
 
First, IaaS delivers the most fundamental type of cloud services, including virtualization, servers, 
networks, and storage to business users, while the users still have a range of other platforms and 
applications on the service provider’s infrastructure. The cloud services are provided online, on-
demand and on a pay-as-you-go basis, thereby enabling scaling resources up and down. For 
customers, this reduces the need for up-front capital expenditures or investment in unnecessary 
resources. For their service, IaaS providers have to host large physical data centres, which contain 
physical machines required to power the various layers of abstraction developed on top of them.  
 
Because building and hosting a (global) network of servers and data centres requires huge upfront 
capital investment, the IaaS market is characterised by only a few competitors – with a top-tier of 
three to four leading competitors. For instance, organisations that are predominantly interested in 
systems that enable them to transfer massive data packages, like a streaming service such as 
Netflix, are bound to a few competitors that provide services that meet the requirements. 
 
Supplementary to storage and other computing resources offered to IaaS users, PaaS offers a 
cloud-based environment, where customers can develop, run and manage prebuilt tools as tailored 
applications. Providers create the underlying infrastructure and offer solutions for managing, 
tailoring and integrating of applications, through abstracting away management of the operating 
system, middleware, and runtime. Purchasing organisations can either choose to do this 








On the platform layer, each of the IaaS competitors offers their services, but there are lots of 
smaller competitors that build or integrate their own solutions on top of the infrastructures of the 
IaaS providers. Because of the more comprehensive and integrated nature of PaaS and the 
absence of a need to invest in physical data centres, there are significantly fewer barriers for 
smaller software vendors to compete in the market. Customers can demand tailored solutions that 
fit their needs in terms of features and functionality, as a result of the large variation and scalability 
of solutions. When compared to IaaS solutions, competition among competitors can be relatively 
limited, while the large extent of differentiation and customisation creates more frequent data 
portability and interoperability issues when users want to switch. 
 
Finally, business users can even run single, specialized applications as a cloud service. This is 
called SaaS. Business users are granted access to vendor’s cloud-based software, where they can 
use remotely hosted applications on their local devices, through the web or an application 
programming interface (API). Software can be either for a particular amount of time or for the 
lifetime. Mainly, SaaS application do not require any downloads as they are used directly through 
the web browser. The supply of software solutions is diverse: business users can make use of 
applications for enterprise resource planning, messaging or office software.  
 
As with PaaS, SaaS providers build and integrate solutions to run on the systems of IaaS-providers. 
Given the large variation in possible SaaS solutions, their scalability in size and complexity, as well 
as their operability via web browsers, the barriers for providers to compete on this market are 
relatively limited. Also, given the market’s fragmentation, customers are able to demand tailored 
solutions that fit their needs in terms of features and functionality. 
 
All in all, as with each type and form of business software, the level of competition in the market for 
cloud-based business software is influenced by the scale and sophistication of software services 
required. 
 
Causes of vendor lock-in 
The scale and sophistication required for business software projects of governments and large 
corporations limits the number of software providers that is able of designing and hosting the core 
infrastructure, especially for IaaS and PaaS. In general, procuring actors will seek an integral 
solution for their administrative systems. In such a solution, various internal sub-systems can 
communicate and interact with each other and share data (data portability and interoperability). For 
example, municipalities may easily operate over a hundred software applications for their public 
services, many of which need to be interconnected to varying extents.140 Furthermore, providers 
take care of ongoing management and development of integration of internal technical solutions. As 
a result, business users have by and large one primary point of external contact for IT related 
matters. The need for comprehensive, sizeable infrastructure favours large solution providers over 
smaller counterparts. 
 
To illustrate this concentration: on a total of 89 ongoing Dutch government IT projects with a value 
of over € 5 million in 2018, Capgemini was active in 20 of these projects, IBM in 14 and ATOS in 
11.141 From a competition perspective, this is a relatively small group of leading, large software 
firms that is serving a considerable share of the market for large-scale software projects. Overall, 
their scale, resources and technical expertise create barriers to enter the market for newcomers 
and smaller software firms. 
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In addition, purchasers tend to stick to the systems created by these software suppliers, as 
maintaining existing systems through continuous development and maintenance is economically 
preferable over investing in comprehensive system upgrades. As a result, the core of software 
infrastructures is often built on licensed solutions which become so-called legacy systems over time 
– systems which run on outdated technology and need continuous updates and upgrades to comply 
with today’s technical and functional software requirements.142  
 
Furthermore, these systems offer limited technical compatibility with software solutions from other 
and sometimes even the same supplier. To function properly within the internal processes of an 
organisation, these legacy systems either need to be replaced by new systems or require 
continuous maintenance and development. Although the cost of fixing the legacy systems recur 
regularly, they are generally lower compared to the cost of implementing a new system, making 
them an appealing business case to purchasers – especially because the pace of software 
innovation quickly transforms a newly implemented system into a legacy system as well.143 
 
The key problem with legacy software is its limited compatibility with new software from other 
suppliers, which is amplified by the use of proprietary, licensed solutions by software suppliers.144 
Data accessibility and exchange is core to the optimization of organisation’s processes, but is not 
naturally supported between solutions. This reinforces the edge of incumbent big suppliers over 
smaller or new competitors. 
 
The preferential position of big software suppliers causes organizations to become locked-in with 
their dominant software supplier.145 This ‘vendor lock-in’ entails that organizations cannot (easily) 
integrate software solutions into the system of the primary provider or switch the entire system 
altogether, without risking the continuation of their administrative system’s functioning.146 Especially 
at the horizontal level, where users’ fear of disruptive and costly software switches to competitors 
strengthens the position of incumbent providers in keeping their clients and charging them 
considerable service fees for continuation of their services. As an illustration, an estimated 72% of 
companies’ IT budgets are dedicated to keep existing software systems running. 147 Each new 
application has to be made compatible to the existing network of applications for optimal 
functioning. The European Commission reported that 42% of the organizations monitored in a study 
on vendor lock-in, experienced an ICT lock-in.148 
 
Some business software customers deliberately select smaller providers for their software, or 
providers that ensure operability with other software providers; however, when these smaller 
providers gain momentum, leading providers might acquire them to integrate their knowledge and 
skills, and avert the rise of a significant competitor. As a result, customers may end up a large 
software providers, even if they try to prevent this. This reinforces vendor lock-in. 
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Consequences of vendor lock-in 
Although, a trustworthy software supplier that understands a client’s existing systems and future software 
needs is in essence a perfect business partner, the situation of a vendor lock-in creates perverse 
incentives for software providers. Reports of how software providers make use of their powerful position at 
the expense of their clients are numerous and date back to 2011. 
 
With a recent publication, Dutch chief information officers (CIOs) renewed political attention for the matter, 
leading to Parliamentary questions about the dependency on software providers.149. United in the CIO 
Platform Nederland, over a hundred large software buyers expressed concerns about the stranglehold of 
software giants. According to the CIO Platform and news reports, these firms abuse the asymmetric 
distribution of technical expertise and the limited mobility to change from one supplier to another in various 
ways to optimize their revenues. For instance, by overcharging clients for their services, by delivering 
incomplete or outdated services that need additional add-ons, by stopping the development of (security) 
updates of software, or through systematic budget overruns. 150 151 152 153 154  
 
Another frequently applied method is through conducting onsite inspections at the client’s premises. These 
inspections aim to reveal unauthorized use of software licenses and are agreed upon in contracts; 
however, if organisations have used too many licenses, which often happens unintentionally, software 
providers issue claims ranging up to billions of euros by charging list prices instead of the discounted user 
terms agreed upon in initial contracts. 155 156 157 Moreover, software providers surprise clients with 
unannounced and one-sided mark-ups in license agreements (increasing prices by a multiple of two or 
three).158 159 In some cases, it was reported that instead of warning clients in advance that the terms and 
conditions of licenses had changed, providers decided retrospectively that clients were ‘non-compliant’ to 
new rules, and issued claims adding up to more than three billion euros.160 161 
 
Nonetheless, the CIO-platform provides just a sub-sample of Dutch multinationals, and not all 
organisations report similar issues. It could be argued that the switching costs are simply 
considerable and inevitable given the nature of software products. However, these switching costs 
are not so much locking clients in at the back-end of the service agreement with a provider, but are 
the result of considerations of purchasers at the frontend of the service agreement, when 
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negotiating a deal and choosing one provider over another. Notwithstanding whether these 
considerations were either deliberate and thoughtful, or insufficiently informed initially, they could 
lead to considerable transaction costs for future software-related choices. 
 
The accelerating pace of technological development and (its corresponding) customer demand for 
business software causes a continuous need for new, innovative connections between systems and 
new functionalities. However, uncertainty and fear for high costs lead both customers and 
developers to ty down contracts for software use and development to the last detail. This lack of 
flexibility causes tensions between both parties in the remainder of the contract, as the time frame 
of the contract does not correspond with the dynamics of the market and technological 
development. 
 
Although both supplier and purchaser play a part in concluding risk averse contracts, the supplier 
can direct negotiations in the preferred direction through their superior bargaining power. As a 
result of the considerable transition costs when changing software supplier, suppliers are in a 
position to narrow down possibilities in future contracts once the first contract is concluded, and 
demand considerable price premiums and upgrades for additional software solutions. 
 
The considerable costs for transition and lack of flexibility in existing software contracts limit 
purchasers. The degree of limitation is disputed, however. An expert indicated that transitions from 
one large software supplier to the other happen at most once every ten to twenty years. Uncertainty 
and limitations would thus only be experienced incidentally. The other way around, it could also be 
argued that costs for transition and limited portability and interoperability in case of transition create 
a disincentive to switch software providers in the first place. 
 
Either way, experts agree that switching software suppliers is a disruptive and costly process in 
terms of time and costs, which influences the frequency of transitions and the degree to which 
purchasers perceive it as a barrier – and software providers are aware of this anxiety and exploit it 
by raising prices for its clients.  
 
This makes upfront negotiating of the terms of the initial service contract crucial. Investing time and 
effort in negotiating contracts with software providers that are mutually beneficial, and creating an 
in-house, skilled IT (procurement) capacity that reflects the size and growth of an organisation, as 
well as the complexity of its (software-related) operations is vital. 162 163 
 
 
6.3 Analysis of research questions 
6.3.1 Which role does data play in the business model and what are the benefits that data provides? 
Operational data from clients represents a core function in the market for business software. It is 
the key input for the business software users, and as such is at the core of the business model of 
software suppliers. Software providers control access to that data by managing the infrastructure in 
which organisations structure and analyse data. 
 
For business software providers, as opposed to other cases about data use in companies, it is 
therefore not so much about the extensive creation, collection and analysis of valuable or intimate 
personal data, or about which company has more or better access than others. Privacy is also a 
less relevant issue, because this type of software providers typically maintain the infrastructure in 
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which the actual data is stored and have no access to the underlying data. If they do have access 
to data, it is because the data is meant to be archived, aggregated, analysed, combined, and so on, 
for administrative, operational, or other business purposes.  
 
In this case, impact is rather created through the organisation’s data infrastructure in a portfolio of 
applications, data sets and sources. Uninterrupted data portability and interoperability between 
licensed, legacy solutions of software suppliers facilitates efficient use by business users. New 
solutions built upon that legacy increase efficiency of the comprehensive network of applications 
and databases, facilitating economic benefit, such as synergies, more efficient internal processes, 
better informed decision-making, and increased innovation. 
 
Benefits can be expected from a societal perspective as well. First, a well-functioning data 
infrastructure offers a more secure mode of data exchange between applications, as compared to, 
for instance, sharing data via e-mail. Moreover, governments can use the integration of applications 
and their datasets for more evidence-based monitoring and policymaking, better informed policy 
and services to citizens. 
 
However, unifying the categorization of personal or business data throughout the economy, to 
facilitate its use and transfer through a standardized and exchangeable machine-readable format is 
a complex matter. Early examples of attempts to standardize all generic standards and data 
formats for software systems in one sector, such as in the oil industry164, proved to be a slow and 
painful process within one sector – let alone introducing such standards for the entire European 
economy.  
 
The concentrated market for business software frustrates free data flow between solutions, as 
market players have no incentive to contribute to the proposed standardization. In sectors where 
vertical and horizontal data sharing is (potentially) beneficial to both involved parties, such as in e-
commerce or social media, market players have been putting considerably more effort into data 
consolidation and have been more successful in creating infrastructures that are interoperable and 
allow for portability of data. 
 
6.3.2 Which data and types of data are indispensable?  
Instead of focusing on direct data sharing between software providers, the focus is on the 
infrastructure for data portability and the impact of mandatory or voluntary initiatives to develop 
such infrastructures on the freedom of choice for business software users and its impact on 
competition between business software developers.  
 
Relevant types of data cover operational data from internal and external processes and operations 
administered by software users, the organisation’s social data stored in CRM and SRM systems, 
and transactional data. Just how versatile operational data can be, is shown by looking at the 
example of a medium-sized Dutch municipality. Such an organisation easily offers tens of public 
services – such as garbage collection, services related to permits and personal documentation, 
social security, education and urban planning – which are all administered internally to keep track of 
relevant characteristics, such as the progress, frequency and quality of service delivery. Each task, 
in turn, requires the collection of different (types of) specific data. Furthermore, for optimal internal 
processes and service delivery to clients, various datasets within each of these services need to be 
connected through applications that are interoperable and able of exchanging data. Moreover, in 
some cases, communication between applications for disparate services is required, creating the 
need for interaction between administrative software applications. All in all, municipalities easily 
have over a hundred different software applications for the public services they provide.  
                                                          









6.3.3 Can data portability facilitate entry or strengthen competition? 
As remarked above, in this case we do not address access to indispensable data, but the 
possibilities for data portability between administrative systems (and their infrastructures in 
particular). 
 
Reasons for and impact of limited software switching 
Discontinuity of software or obstacles in the transition to alternative software pose a serious threat 
for customer’s business processes, hindering free movement between software providers once the 
infrastructure is implemented. After a first contract period, generally agreed for a period of three 
years, software users have to renegotiate the contracts terms; however, no customer would like to 
switch software provider again, because of the significant transition costs, implementation issues 
and corresponding internal resistance to change. This strongly limits free customer movement and 
competition in the market for business software.  
 
Three factors influence the costs for transition between software systems. First, the costs in money 
and time to renegotiate the contract. Second, the integration of new software in the customer’s 
internal processes. And finally, uncertainty about the ability to reuse all data in the new software 
system. Data has to be transferred in formats that operate in both the old and new system – if these 
systems do not offer data portability, data will first have to be transformed. 
 
Once a client is locked-in, ‘aftermarkets’ start playing a significant role. Initially, costs for acquiring 
software solutions are relatively low, but once a customer is in, the supplier works with considerably 
higher fees for continuation of services. Incumbent software providers are aware of the transition 
costs faced by users. They often can raise prices in their extension offers just below the price for 
transition to a competitor. As a result, customers tend to stick to their primary supplier as it is more 
economically advantageous than implementing a new software system.  
 
Moreover, interview partners claimed that software providers are primarily interested in selling more 
solutions to their customers, rather than in optimizing the use of solutions that are already in the 
customer’s software portfolio. This is reflected in the incentives created for sales personnel that is 
rewarded based on targets for sales of additional software solutions and not for optimization of 
software that is already in use. For instance, providers promote cloud services to their clients as an 
option to increase flexibility and portability, but only offer it as an add-on to their existing software 
system. As such, generally, customers can only scale-up their system with new solutions, while 
providers are reluctant in offering possibilities to scale-down costs through repelling redundant 
solutions. This is especially the case when a provider initially offered ‘on-premise’ software and 
starts offering cloud services. 
 
Overall, business clients are tied to their primary software supplier, due to limited data portability 
and limited interoperability between administrative systems of various providers. Especially at the 
horizontal level, where users’ fear of disruptive and costly software switches to competitors 
strengthens the position of incumbent providers in keeping their clients and charging them 
considerable service fees for continuation of their services. As such, choosing a software supplier 
creates path dependency within an organization: with each additional solutions or service from a 
given supplier, a client becomes more locked-in with this supplier. The more unilaterally software is 
provided by one supplier, the more dependent a buyer becomes on their software.165 In turn, it 
becomes increasingly costly to replace the existing administrative software with competitors’ 
                                                          









software, while it is comparatively less expensive to get future software applications from the same 
supplier.166 
 
Effect of data portability on competition 
With the emergence of cloud services in business software in recent years, more and more 
developers moved away from IT systems based on offline, purely closed-source or proprietary 
software services towards solutions that allow for more transparent and open software systems. 
These modern services operate in the cloud, based on open standards or on open source.  
 
Leading software developers have offered more transparency in the ground rules and codes of their 
software and partially published them online. This, in turn, creates platforms on top of which smaller 
SaaS developers of niche or small-scale software solutions are capable of developing software 
solutions that can run on the platforms and infrastructures of PaaS and IaaS market leaders. This 
enhances the business case of both leaders and newcomers: smaller developers can offer their 
solutions to all users of a market leader’s infrastructure, while market leaders can offer a more 
differentiated portfolio of solutions that can be hosted on their infrastructure. This sharing incentive 
works predominantly in a vertical setting between large infrastructure or platform providers and 
smaller, specialized software solution providers. 
 
From a horizontal perspective, however, there is less incentive for solution developers to coordinate 
and tailor solutions to enable easy switching. For instance, technical issues complicate a switch 
from one primary cloud storage provider to another resulting in risks of discontinuity of software 
systems or data loss. In addition to the technical barrier, facilitating a successful transition of 
solutions (in terms of portability and interoperability) is a costly process which further propels 
switching costs. An additional advantage of considerable switching costs to developers is that it 
boosts their ability to demand higher service fees for continuation of their services once they are in. 
All in all, there is no stimulus for suppliers to lower the barriers for a switch from their solution to 
horizontal competitors’ solutions. Initiatives to lower lock-in should, therefore, mainly focus on 
horizontal competition. 
 
Data portability could (in theory) lower some of the technical barriers for horizontal competition 
between providers of similar software solutions on the market, through establishing the fundament 
for interchangeability of their applications. As such, it mitigates the risk of a vendor lock-in and it 
facilitates entry into the market.167  
 
We note that data portability is not the only restricting factor in competition. For example, in the 
market for IaaS, competition is limited to a handful of operators in the market, because these are 
the only ones financially capable of providing the solutions. Their financial position enables them to 
build and run a global network of large-scale data centres, which is impossible for smaller 
competing firms due to the complexity and the high investments costs involved. 
 
6.3.4 Are there bottlenecks for porting data? 
The need for sharing or integrating with other data sources or organisations developed quickly only 
in the last decades. However, most initial information systems were initially not designed with the 
idea that its contents or functionalities should be replaceable, sharable or integrative with other 
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systems. Often, the systems were offline and proprietary, functioning solely internal purposes, such 
as measuring inventory and production or storing personnel information. 
 
Consequently, traditional proprietary software can frustrate the optimal functioning of an 
organisation. A manifesto drawn up by employers' associations gives insight in the consequences 
of this for Dutch healthcare organisations.168 In the manifesto, issues arising from IT systems that 
cannot exchange data are said to have a detrimental impact on both efficiency and privacy. For 
instance, without the possibility of secure and scalable data exchange the use of technology is 
inefficient. Data exchange is currently difficult for health providers between the infrastructures of 
various national and regional institutions as open standards are not implemented at all or in 
different ways. Also, because data exchange between IT systems is impossible, it happens through 
outdated methods that are unsecured and diffuse. 
 
This example shows the drawback of not being able to port and share data across different IT 
systems within a sector. Across sectors, the barriers for porting and exchanging data may even be 
larger because each organisation has different internal systems and needs, their operational issues 
are different as well. While a municipality has to store and integrate various data sources for a 
variety of diverging public services, a globally operating multinational faces issues with systems 
throughout the world that should measure similar activities in a similar manner and format, 
overcoming latency issues and legal issues regarding software licences. Alternatively, for a medical 
organisation the time-critical element of a system might be most important, while for a chemical firm 
the accuracy of the information in the system is most important. 
 
Technical, legal and financial bottlenecks 
In section 6.3.3, three influential factors for transition were mentioned: complexity of integration of 
new software time and costs, uncertainty about the ability to reuse all data in the new software 
system, and finally the costs involved in terms of money and time. The first two relate to the 
technical feasibility of facilitating data portability between software from different software providers. 
Beside the actual technical feasibility, it is also relevant to asses a user’s legal power to enforce 
disposal of his own data in agreements with software providers: for instance, could they legally 
reject an organisation’s desire to withdraw his data from their software? The third, then, relates to 
the financial barriers to enforce data portability, which in this case predominantly comes down to 
the switching costs involved. 
 
Technical feasibility 
As described in detail in section 6.3.3, developers’ willingness to bridge technical barriers between 
similar systems (‘substitutes’) is limited, as it does not benefit their business case. Currently, if there 
are technical limitations to making legacy core software interoperable, business users may be 
forced to migrate to entire new core system and will have to incur substantial switching costs. In this 
case, data portability is essential for migration processes. As a result, one might argue that 
mandatory data sharing requires a broader policy solution that focusses on portability between, and 
interoperability of, legacy core software (including access to data bases) which facilitate access for 
third party developers. Still, the issue remains whether it is technically feasible to create portability 
between each and every software solution. 
 
Not so long ago, in the 90s and 00s, facilitating portability and interoperability between disparate 
systems and solutions of various providers still was technically challenging and required intensive 
commitment from skilled experts to create the necessary APIs. Nowadays, it is no longer an 
engineering challenge. In universities, students can easily do it through using Representational 
                                                          









state transfer (REST) interfaces169. Technological advancement has made the creation of 
interoperable interfaces significantly less complex. As a result, stakeholders from both customer 
and vendor perspective have no doubt that creating interoperability is technically feasible for 
software providers: data portability can be done at different levels and in a unified way.  
 
Although from IaaS to PaaS to SaaS, the portability of data becomes more challenging with each 
layer, there are ways of unifying this in terms of transparency on data portability. For IaaS services, 
data portability can create data lakes, such as envisioned in the Open Data Initiative, which can be 
facilitated relatively easily between the hand full of providers. Although there are just a few large-
scale cloud infrastructure providers, competition among them appears fierce. For PaaS and SaaS, 
the extent of differentiation and customisation at the level of creates more frequent data portability 
and interoperability issues when users want to switch. Switching could be facilitated if the sector 
adopts standards that facilitate portability and interoperability between software providers. 
 
Stakeholders agreed that almost everything is technologically possible in terms of portability and 
interoperability, as long as there is a well-defined customer demand. In many instances, 
sophisticated business users nowadays demand the ability to access and transfer their data. 
Solutions that cannot meet that bar will not be competitive in the crowded software markets. 
 
Legal feasibility 
Business user representatives feel locked-in to their arrangements with business providers, due to 
technical dependency on the provider and service contracts with rigid legal restrictions. However, 
according to providers, theorized restrictions from a legal perspective have no significant impact on 
portability and interoperability. Obviously both sides have a different perspective on this and there 
may be need for more legal clarity.  
 
Financial feasibility 
Providers argue that the underlying reasons for the perceived technical and legal lock-in could be 
traced back to the financial barriers for switching software (providers). In any level of software 
switch, there is going to be switching costs involved. Vendors argue that although this might 
assume an issue, this not problematic in itself: clients want to avoid lock-in with one provider, but 
switching costs are simply inevitable. However, switching costs are not so much locking clients in at 
the back-end of a service agreement, but are the result of deliberate commercial considerations of 
purchasers at the frontend of the service agreement, when negotiating a deal and choosing one 
provider over another. This implies an information asymmetry during the tendering process which 
may be taken away by a general legal framework.  
 
The implementation of mandatory data sharing obligations, preferably at least at EU level, that 
introduces and enforces uniform standards to facilitate data portability might be a necessary step to 
create more technical flexibility and less uncertainties for business users.  
 
6.3.5 Is essential data currently being shared (voluntarily, on a commercial basis)? 
In essence, there is not yet a comprehensive, generally applied framework in place at national or 
European level that facilitates data sharing between companies in the market for administrative 
software – either voluntary or mandatory. Nonetheless, emerging initiatives stimulate increased 
vertical coordination and exchange between various market players. 
 
An important recent development is the increased application of cloud infrastructures in business 
software in recent years. Leading software infrastructure and platform providers make use of more 
open and transparent systems, which created a platform infrastructure upon which smaller 
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developers of niche or small-scale software solutions are able to develop their own software 
solutions. This has enhanced the diversification of the market and the business case of both 
leaders and newcomers on the market. However, this sharing predominantly takes place in a 
vertical setting between large infrastructure or platform providers and smaller, specialized software 
solution providers. 
 
From a horizontal perspective, there is less incentive for solution developers to coordinate and tailor 
solutions to enable easy switching, as this harms their own business model. In recent years, private 
companies as well as national and European public institutions have launched initiatives to facilitate 
horizontal portability and interoperability in an attempt to mitigate lock-in and switching issues. So 
far, however, these have failed to materialize a breakthrough in the creation of sector-wide 
horizontal data portability. 
 
Voluntary initiatives 
One such attempt by private companies is the Open Data Initiative, orchestrated by three big IT 
suppliers – Adobe, Microsoft and SAP. It aims to create a common data model, which enhances 
interoperability and data exchange between their disparate applications and platforms170. Under this 
model, business application data is pooled, and clients are able to read and write data from all three 
companies’ business applications and build intelligent applications on them. In addition, the model 
understands relationships between data sources and harmonizes siloed data to create new 
value.171 
 
Although the three software giants compete, there are rationales behind their partnership. First, 
they share a strong customer base. Second, if they decide not to partner up, other firms will 
become active in creating interoperability and data portability between data sources. As such, the 
initiative comes as a response to a broader trend of software integration, even among market rivals. 
This offers customers more supplier flexibility and urges software companies to meet clients’ need 
for a tailored, integrated network of applications.172 According to a representative of one of the three 
organisations, this initiative mirrors the need of the market, as well as their broader view on how the 
sector should look and work together. 
 
Some experts are sceptic about the added value of these private sector initiatives, as such actors 
generally are driven by self-interest. In other cases where larger software suppliers offered no or 
low code software on which organisations could build their own software,  the complexity and 
costliness of switching sustain the incentive to exploit customers. 
 
National alternative 
At the national level, several attempts have been initiated. In 2014, a parliamentary scrutiny173 of 
government IT projects was launched, which led to the establishment of Supplier Lifecycle 
Management (SLM), as a concentrated effort to deal with the power of big IT providers. SLM 
functions as a centralized knowledge and management facility for its most important software 
suppliers, such as Microsoft, SAP, Oracle, IBM, KPN and Ordina.174 It brings together technical and 
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user experience, as well as procurement expertise with these suppliers. SLM focuses on enhancing 
IT’s contribution to the government’s strategic goals, and aims to optimize government-wide 
efficiencies and economies of scale in IT contracts and licences. The core of these activities 
concentrate on facing software suppliers as one integral public sector purchaser, that internally re-
uses and shares contracts, licenses and application platforms.175 176 
 
The idea behind SLM is that better coordinated demand management of the government reduces 
the risk that organisations are played off against one another, or that redundant software licenses 
are acquired. Since its introduction, the SLM teams have been successful in achieving their 
objective. The concentration of central government’s software demand in one organisation has 
increased their bargaining power vis-à-vis software suppliers. SLM teams created a coherent and 
strong counterpart, that forced big suppliers, such as Microsoft, to make concessions to their terms, 
functionalities and licences. Moreover, the SLM teams have forced Microsoft to make these 
concessions enforceable for all other Dutch software customers of Microsoft. Although this new 
procurement strategy needed considerable initial investment (about € 5mln), the saved investment 
costs are in the tens of millions of euros. 
 
Still, in essence, the reach of SLM teams only covers ministries and other central government 
institutions, due to restrictions on central procurement for other (semi-)public institutions, such as 
municipalities or hospitals. Enhanced possibilities for aggregation of demand in IT procurement 
could increase the bargaining power of customers in more sectors. 
 
Notwithstanding the successful approach of the SLM teams for central government institutions, 
many business software users still perceive to be locked-in. Recently, the Dutch national 
government presented its ‘Strategic I-agenda Rijksdienst 2019-2021'177, where it expressed its 
further ambitions regarding solutions for IT procurement issues. In essence, their goal is to 
transform their IT infrastructure into an information-driven system, where functionalities and data 
are at the core, rather than the suppliers of these functionalities. Implementation of government-
wide interoperability and data portability of autonomous systems are ongoing and crucial in this 
regard, with the goal of enabling re-use and exchange of data between government branches. 
 
In practice, the strategy comes down to a situation where government makes use of the market 
when possible, but it relies on own software development when necessary or favourable. An 
elaborate sourcing strategy will guide the use of market expertise. This strategy promotes a careful 
consideration of the use of products and services from the public cloud, and possibilities for own 
development and management of functionalities and applications. Also, the strategy should enable 
smaller innovative players to compete in procurement and reduce vendor lock-in. Specific attention 
is raised for cloud hosting by private operators, because this entails the storage of government data 
at privately run datacentres. In this case, it is a crucial consideration to limit the dependency on one 
supplier through consequent use of open standards. 
 
The use of open standards and open source software 
Open standards 
The use of open standards is advocated as an instrument to mitigate the risk of vendor lock-in. As 
opposed to supplier-bound standards, open standards are not software-specific and therefore not 
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bound to licenses. Rather, open standards focus on the required functionalities of software 
solutions and on enabling data portability and interoperability between software with similar open 
standards. Open standards are not only used in open-source software, but also in proprietary 
software, and their application by suppliers can as such bridge the existing vendor lock-in.178 The 
manifesto for healthcare providers employs open standards in the (semi-) public sector, as does the 
Forum Standaardisatie, an executive agency for the national government, in a guidance document 
for IT procurement.179  
 
The use of open standards is finding its way quite successfully even in proprietary business 
software, but open standards are unlikely to live up to the expectation of removing portability and 
interoperability issues indefinitely. Software providers argue that it is utopian to believe that good 
enough standards would resolve all problems, in particular because of the strong demand for 
customised solutions. Although nowadays it would be technically feasible to design APIs and 
implement protocols that could facilitate a uniform software standard, neither developers nor users 
would be served by a “one-size-fits-all” approach – simply because customisation and uniqueness 
cannot go together with and standardisations cannot go together. 
 
Open source 
Open-source software, interfaces and ecosystems are said to be vital for interoperability of internal 
systems, while closed systems hinder integration of data from various data-driven systems.180  
 
Open-source software is a collaboration and organisation model for the production of software 
resources in all layers of the technology stack.181 Due to the absence of costs for licensing, open-
source software seems beneficial in terms of potential cost savings. Costless disposition of the 
source code stimulates the possibility that multiple suppliers develop and maintain the software, 
solving the dependency on a single supplier. 
 
Open source is more cost efficient for users and is said to solve dependency on a small group of 
suppliers to fix legacy and license problems. Nonetheless, in practice the mitigating effect of open-
source software on vendor lock-in is disputed.182 183 In essence, the difference between open-
source and proprietary code lies in their licensing model, and the quality of software and ability to 
port data are in principle not impacted by this difference. In effect, open-source only offers a 
comprehensive software solution when combined with proprietary software, and as such the 
increased use of open-source software is unlikely to significantly reduce the need for licensed 
(proprietary) software. Eventually, open-source solutions have to evolve into or supplemented with 
commercially packages to become a viable option for business users, because open-source is not 
providing users the necessary support. Consequently, users will need a software provider’s 
expertise for tested and sophisticated services, and the implementation and maintenance thereof. 
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EU-level initiatives on standardisation 
Initiatives to tackle vendor lock-ins have also been undertaken at the EU-level. For example, DG 
CNECT (European Commission) presented best practices for ICT procurement based on standards 
in order to promote efficiency and reduce lock-in to organisations suffering from a lock-in.184 
 
The most promising initiative at EU level is conducted by the SWIPO (switching and porting) Codes 
of Conduct Working Group.185 This working group was established as one of two Digital Single 
Market (DSM) cloud stakeholder working groups in 2017. Their objective was to conduct self-
regulatory work in the areas of cloud security and porting data/switching cloud service providers, 
ultimately leading to self-regulatory Codes of Conduct on data portability across different cloud 
infrastructures and across different cloud-based applications that reduce the risk of vendor lock-in 
by cloud service providers. 
 
SWIPO’s Codes could boost the European market for cloud services, by setting pre-defined 
regulation and quality requirements for software providers to compete on the market. In more 
traditional types of software, regulation could only be introduced after the fact, potentially leading to 
complex issues of non-compliance of fully integrated business software systems. The market for 
cloud services, on the other hand, is still establishing and could implement such requirements more 
easily. This could make the European market for cloud services more fluid and enables smaller 
companies and new market entrants to compete. 
 
The group – co-chaired by representatives from the cloud service industry and from business users 
of cloud services, with a balanced mix of legal, technical and economical expertise and professional 
experience in the field of cloud computing – published its outcomes in November 2019.186 These 
included Codes of Conduct for both cloud infrastructures (IaaS) and cloud-based applications 
(SaaS), and were presented as a milestone for the European data economy, reducing vendor lock-
in and facilitating competition between cloud service providers. For instance, the Codes define best 
practices and information requirements for sufficiently detailed, clear and transparent information 
before a cloud service agreement enters into force. 
 
However, the Codes’ added value were subject of debate for involved stakeholders. Important 
stakeholders like Cigref (representing 150 large French companies and public administrations) 
responded that they could not recognise the legitimacy of the documents, as the documents failed 
to represent equally the interests of all stakeholders involved. The failure is “the result of a systemic 
asymmetry of skills, resources and objectives between those of some of the world’s leading cloud 
service providers, on the one hand, who defend the core of their business and their ability to lock 
their customers, and on the other hand those users whose lobbying in this area is not the 
business”.187 This argumentation was supported by statements from stakeholders involved in this 
study. 
 
Developer representatives had significantly more interest in a satisfactory outcome than their 
counterparts in the working group, as it touched upon the core of their activities and business 
model. Developers had a unified objective and maximized lobby power in terms of money and time, 
effectively capturing the policy process. Although customer representatives from ministries and 
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large corporations contributed, their interests are primarily concerned with their core business and 
were as such less direct, as was their corresponding capacity in terms of time and money. Finally, 
customers’ individual interests were rather divers. 
 
The Commission’s SWIPO initiative could potentially facilitate data portability by laying down its 
technical ground rules. The self-regulatory Codes of Conduct for data portability across different 
cloud infrastructures and across different cloud-based applications are defined with consent of 
software suppliers. The Codes potentially make the European market for cloud services more fluid 
and enables smaller companies and new market entrants to compete there as well. However, so 
far, the added value has been disputed by involved stakeholders, as the Codes were highly 
influenced by the perspective of the world’s leading cloud service providers, while input of other 
user stakeholders was limited. 
 
6.3.6 What is the impact of mandatory data sharing on innovation incentives? 
Given its technical and legal feasibility, the impact of mandatory data sharing on innovation 
incentives is twofold.  
 
Potential benefits for innovation 
On the one hand, obligatory data portability between software applications lowers technical barriers 
to smaller providers for offering their software applications on the market, as it creates the 
fundament for compatibility of their applications to the systems of larger providers. As such, it 
facilitates lower entry barriers for market entrants and smaller providers and contributes to a more 
diversified market supply. 
 
Still, experts argue that given the size and complexity of software systems for large organisations, 
purchasers are reluctant to select small software developers for their projects. Notwithstanding 
small competitors’ ability to implement large-scale IT projects, the diversification of supply in 
combination with the possibility to integrate solutions from various providers in one system, offers 
purchasers more possibilities to shop between providers. The increased ease and reduced 
transition costs of switching between suppliers generate some leverage for purchasers with current 
and competing suppliers, both during the duration of the contract and in their negotiations for a new 
contract or contract renewal. 
 
As a result, dominant providers will have somewhat less ground to apply their usual their pricing 
strategies in negotiations with software purchasers – possibly leading to some cost efficiencies for 
purchasers. Moreover, they suppliers may experience more discipline to provide quality, tailored to 
the needs of their customers, rather than pushing for upselling of additional software solutions. Note 
that we envisage such effects to occur only to a certain extent, due to other (persistent) causes of 
customer lock-in, as discussed above. 
 
Nonetheless, the tendency for big software firms to acquire software companies before they can 
develop into a serious market competitors will not be prevented by data sharing. For venture 
capitalists who invest in innovative and small software start-ups, being taken over by a leading 
software firms can be an objective.  
 
Increased integration of currently autonomous applications and datasets offer several novel data 
connections that could lead to innovations for end-users through re-use and integration. Also, 
increased integration of systems reduces internal duration of processes and a reduction of the 
margin of error. Clients that have had to pay for data sharing through data portability—or who 
decided not to invest in further development of their applications or functionalities due to 








Such innovations can lead to economic benefits, through more efficient internal processes, better 
informed decision-making, and more synergies, as well as in more secure infrastructure for data 
exchange between applications, and evidence-based policymaking. 
 
Potential risks for innovation 
On the one hand, there is a risk of underinvestment in data portability under a mandatory data 
sharing framework. Experiences from the SWIPO Working Groups learned that leading software 
suppliers apply great lobby power, by investing significantly time and money to alter relevant policy 
debates in their preferred direction. They do so because implementing large-scale frameworks that 
enable data portability between software providers harms their business models. If policymakers 
would somehow succeed in implementing a comprehensive framework for data portability, leading 
software developers that have relied on profits received for proprietary software development and 
creating data portability for legacy systems, will be forced to open up their services and find a new 
revenue model. These activities constitute an important element in the work of software suppliers, 
and enforcing (mandatory) data portability between providers would cut off part of their revenue 
stream. 
 
Some experts anticipate that suppliers will protect their business models at great cost, and in case 
data sharing policies come into existence, they might try to find ways to make them less effective. 
At present it is hard to foresee to what extent that may happen though. 
 
More importantly, the development and implementation of the required standards would complicate 
innovation in terms of meeting demand for customised solutions. Mandated data portability will 
create cost efficiencies for business users, but they might come at the expense of increased 
complexity and a more limited scope for innovation for software developers. The services provided 
by software developers are unique, and business users often make deliberate considerations based 
on preference for the unique features of one software provider over another. The implementation of 
standardisation in the sector would harm the tailored and differentiated supply in the sector, 
especially when implemented as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ across differentiated business software 
solutions.  
 
Some providers fear that they continuously enhance their products but get confronted with the need 
to adapt their products when industry standards support a particular feature which their product 
cannot meet as easily as a rival's offering.  
 
6.3.7 What are the risks of data sharing? 
In policy initiatives to facilitate data portability, such as the Open Data Initiative or SWIPO, software 
developers have been actively present and supportive. Of course, their position consists of finding a 
balance between coordination versus room for innovation and diversification. 
 
Experts argue that from a perspective on technical feasibility, overcoming data portability and 
interoperability issues in software systems is already possible. A risk of mandated portability 
approaches could then be that the implementation of government mandated ‘one-size-fits-all’ or 
‘lowest common denominator approaches’ across numerous differentiated business software 
solutions might create some cost efficiencies for business users, at the expense of increased 
complexity and limited innovation. 
 
6.3.8 What are the options under current legislation (general and sector-specific) to make data sharing 
mandatory? 
As opposed to the other case studies, the case of data sharing in administrative software does not 
specifically concern the use and transfer of personal data. Consequently, the right to data portability 








Instead, SWIPO’s self-regulatory codes of conduct for portability between cloud providers as 
introduced through the Regulation on non-personal data may be relevant. Article 6(1) requires the 
European Commission to encourage and facilitate the development of self-regulatory codes of 
conduct at EU level, which include ‘best practices for facilitating the switching of service providers 
and the porting of data in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format including 
open standard formats. This type of intervention is an example of facilitating data sharing through 
non-legally binding measures. So far, the self-regulatory codes of conduct have been insufficiently 
effective in creating and maintaining a competitive data economy, which the Regulation aimed to 
achieve. 
  
Finally, data portability might be imposed as a competition law remedy under the essential facilities 
doctrine but the same limitations as discussed in the other case studies apply, including the 
dominance of the firm involved and the indispensability of the data to be ported. Wider 
requirements of portability and interoperability are better mandated outside of the competition 
framework, for instance by building upon the self-regulatory codes of conduct that are now 
facilitated by the Commission. 
 
6.3.9 Policy options 
As discussed in section 6.3.8, options under current legislations, such as competition law, are 
limited and have a self-regulatory and non-mandatory nature. 
 
Fixes at the national level 
Progress made by the SLM teams in negotiations with big software suppliers on service 
agreements could incentivize policymakers to upgrade the SLM’s mandate and offer leniency in the 
application of procurement rules for organisations that are active in services of general economic 
interest. Strengthening their bargaining power could be a promising possibility to create a more 
equal market structure. 
 
Currently, the SLM teams are sometimes in a position where their powers technically do not meet 
the level of discretion needed to negotiate the terms of a deal – for instance, in terms of 
aggregation of demand. In addition, they could benefit from a more concentrated software 
procurement – for instance, by procuring as a representative of all Dutch municipalities or hospitals. 
For example, because the health care sector is a patchwork of health care providers, ranging from 
completely private to public, the sector is not allowed to concentrate their procurement via the 
Dutch Hospitals Association (NVZ) under the existing competition and procurement regulation. As a 
result, their IT costs are an estimated 50 to 70 per cent higher than those of ministries. 
 
To expand the width of their mandate, the responsible minister could grant the SLM teams 
exemptions to existing procurement rules, like exemptions made for centralized procurement of 
crucial medicines. Under current regulation, some flexibility in aggregation of demand is possible 
when there is a disbalanced playing field between suppliers and purchasers in a market; however, 
there is reluctance, for instance among municipalities, in applying this flexibility as it could lead to 
legal procedures with software providers.188 
 
The need for supranational policy options 
Moreover, stakeholders emphasized that for data sharing policy options to be effective, they had to 
be discussed, created and implemented at a European or even global, rather than a national level. 
In that regard, ministries and representative associations like the CIO Platform maintain in close 
                                                          








contact with their European counterparts – predominantly with the Commission, EDPS and their 
Belgian, French, German and other (North-)Western European partners. Although SWIPO has 
potential at the EU level, it is not yet in the stage of aligning political and technical realities. 
 
One expert indicated that an important step could be the creation or appointment of a central 
authority or gatekeeper that supervises market participation in the market for cloud services. For 
existing software products and services in more mature markets, it might be complex to set and 
enforce quality standards, but this authority could design, implement and enforce central standards 
for crucial elements of cloud services, such as information security, data portability and 
interoperability. A relevant development in this regard is the establishment at EU level of the 
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), which pursues the implementation of central 
standards for information security. 
 
From a software providers perspective, if self-regulatory sectoral agreements, such as SWIPO, 
would be supervised by a third-party authority, it remains to be seen whether it would benefit or 
harm their implementation case. They would benefit most from a global taxonomy, for instance 
through adopting ISO standards in this field at EU-level, instead of defining own standards. Own 
EU-level standards could become problematic in the framework of conflicting developments in other 
parts of the world (e.g. certain discussions currently going on in SWIPO have already been 
resolved in the context of ISO). 
 
Nonetheless, although implementation and supervision of collective standards could be beneficial 
for business users, it should be noted that it follows from this case that it might be a necessary 
condition to remove issues regarding business users’ perceived lock-ins, but is probably not a 
sufficient condition. Lock-ins are the result of high switching costs in software systems, which could 
be reduced in terms of uncertainty of data access and risk of discontinuity of services by 








7 Case: vertical exclusion 
7.1 Case description 
This case is somewhat exceptional, since it does not zero in on a specific market or sector. Instead, 
it explores the blocking of vertical data sharing between vertically integrated platforms and third-
party services. Firms and platforms may start out with a complementary vertical relationship 
fostered through access to data held by the platform. By adding new features, a service provider 
using a platform's data may move closer to the platform's business model, which introduces a 
horizontal relationship, or at least a horizontal, competitive threat. In such cases, the platform may 
decide to block data access. In the past, we have seen examples of services being suddenly 
blocked from data access. For example, Facebook blocked Vine from data access, and recently, 
Strava blocked Relive's data access.   
 
This case elaborates on the example of Strava and Relive. Based on publicly available information, 
this example allows us to clearly illustrate the answers to several questions below. Note that some 
of the questions explored in the previous cases are left out of the case analysis, as they do not 
apply. 
 
Strava allows athletes to track and analyse running and cycling activities, using data collected via 
phones, watches, and third-party tracking devices. It developed into a social network allowing 
athletes to connect and interact with each other. Users benefit from third-party apps that 
complement Strava's functionalities. These third-party apps rely on user data uploaded to Strava 
and shared with the third party. An example is Relive, which generates workout movies and 
visualises tracking data in a 3D map. At certain point in time, Relive was denied access to Strava’s 
API for violating certain terms of agreement. This development illustrates that in general, platforms 
are unlikely to restrain data access for services that complement their own services, but this may be 
different for competing services189. 
 
 
7.2 Analysis of research questions 
7.2.1 Which role does data play in the business model and what are the benefits that data provides? 
In general, platforms typically facilitate vertical data sharing with downstream parties because it 
increases the value of their ecosystems. Third parties benefit from data-sharing agreements 
because it enhances their service or accelerates their growth. Thus, one may expect that vertical 
partnerships emerge automatically. However, as downstream apps move closer to a platform's 
business core functionalities, they may transform in a horizontal competitive threat and (depending 
on the terms of the agreement) could be cut off from data access.  
 
It is instructive to illustrate data usage in business models. Strava started out as a tracking app 
which allows athletes to track and analyse running or cycling activities. Tracking data is collected 
via smart devices (phones or watches) or via third-party tracking devices (such as Garmin or 
Wahoo). Strava soon developed into a social network app allowing athletes to connect and interact 
with other athletes about sports activities and engage in competitions, training and challenges with 
them. Strava is now also open for sports clubs, brands and (sports)retailers to engage in marketing 
activities. Its users can also make use of many third-party apps that complement the functionalities 
                                                          







offered by Strava, including analytics, interaction, training, and visualisers. These third-party apps 
rely on user data uploaded to Strava and shared through Strava’s API.  
 
Strava collects the following types of data190: 
• basic account information (name address, age, gender, contact details, etc.); 
• profile, activities and user information (provided or observed, including videos, foto’s, kudo’s, 
smileys etc.); 
• location data, including speed, altitude, and routes (via Strava app, third party app, third party 
device); 
• health data (via Strava app, third party app, third party device); 
• shared content (provided by users); 
• social graph data (imported from devices or other accounts such as Facebook or Gmail)191; 
• technical data and logfiles. 
 
Relive used to be such a third-party app. Its core functionality is to generate short movies of 
workouts. It visualised Strava’s tracking data in a 3D map and added photos and videos that the 
athlete(s) shot during the exercise192. At the time, Relive retrieved the following data from Strava:  
• location data (for describing the routes that athletes have taken); 
• social graph (for the social feed and networking functions). 
 
Strava was just one of Relive's providers of tracking data. Its users can also import data from 
several other platforms with tracking functionalities193, as well directly from a smartphone's GPS. In 
particular, Relive (itself as well as through various sources) gathered the following data types: 
• basic account information (name address, age, gender, contact details, etc.); 
• location data (via devices with GPS functionality) 
• photos and videos uploaded directly (and timestamped by the device)194; 
• map data and imagery providers195 . 
 
Thus, one can observe that Strava is a social network that facilitates member interactions. The 
main growth driver of the platform consists of direct network effects. Next, Strava provides a 
platform for app developers, driving indirect network effects. Data about user profiles is essential as 
well as data on users’ social graph. Strava as well as other parties develop a range of 
functionalities. These third-party developers need access to data collected or aggregated by Strava. 
Relive used to make use of tracking data aggregated by Strava as well as by Relive itself. 
 
Business models tend to adapt and change. At some point in time, Relive developed and 
introduced social interaction functionalities for which it needed access to Strava’s social graph data; 
or more specifically, it needed access to an individual’s social graph on Strava and aimed to target 
users’ friends through Strava. For Relive this was a means to leverage direct network effects from 
Strava into its own app. Below, we discuss the subsequent developments. 
 
7.2.2 Which data and types of data are indispensable?  
In our illustration, we focus on data which is indispensable for Relive. Initially, its business model 
only required observed/provided location data and user-generated content (specifically photos and 
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192 It is possible to merge photo and video material of persons being within 50 meters distance of each other during the 
majority of the exercise. https://www.relive.cc/support. 
193 Garmin Connect, Wahoo, Polar Flow, Suunto, Apple Health, Endomondo, adidas Running by Runtastic, Under Armour 
(inclusief: MapMyRun, MapMyWalk, MapMyRide, MapMyHike, etc.) of Ride met GPS 








videos) to offer its core functionality. After the evolution towards a social networking feature, 
additional data (in particular social data) became a necessary, additional ingredient. 
 
7.2.3 Can access to indispensable data facilitate entry or strengthen competition? 
Although this case is about vertical relationships, it is useful to also consider horizontal issues. 
Strava and Relive started out with a complementary vertical relationship. By adding new features, a 
Relive moved closer to the platform's business model. This development gave rise to a horizontal 
competitive threat for Strava. By blocking data access, Strava may have been trying to defend its 
market position against this horizontal threat.  
 
As we will point out in more detail below, Strava’s API agreement excludes partners offering apps 
similar to or competing with Strava. Forbidding this type of clause would support horizontal 
competition and stimulate platforms as well as downstream app developers to innovate more. We 
note that it is not uncommon for platforms to include such terms in API agreements. In the past, 
Facebook also did not provide data access to apps that replicated its core functionality. However, 
the company dropped this policy in 2018.  
 
Regarding horizontal data sharing, as explained in the cases about online search and social 
networks, a lack of access to an incumbent's data may hamper horizontal competition between 
same-service-providers. Data sharing may mitigate first-mover advantages related to learning 
effects, and data sharing may stimulate multi-homing which mitigates the competitive advantage 
stemming from network effects. The question remains, however, whether data access is essential 
for newcomers in the market, or if they can find different routes to access data or build an 
innovative business model to effectively compete with incumbents with a data advantage.  
 
Coming back to vertical data sharing, in traditional markets it is not logical for the owner of an 
essential facility to block a downstream service that does not compete with its own downstream 
services. A refusal to deal must then be motivated by efficiency or quality reasons. In digital 
markets, however, the threat for a platform of being intermediated or disintermediated by another 
player is much larger, and even comes from players currently offering complementary services in 
the downstream market. A platform may want to defend itself against competitive threats like these 
(or at least not want to facilitate them) by terminating or limiting the partnership with the 
downstream player or by limiting its growth otherwise. Such defensive actions come at the expense 
of the richness of the platform’s ecosystem and may drive users away to rival platforms unless the 
platform is dominant196. Thus, there can be an anti-competitive motivation behind a refusal to 
provide access to data. However, note that a refusal can be legitimate, for example when data 
sharing damages the privacy of data subjects (and would undermine confidence in the platform), or 
when it would lead to free riding. 
 
Based on this type of reasoning, Strava's termination of the agreement with Relive could perhaps 
qualify as vertical exclusion under competition law. A pre-condition (to be proven by the competition 
authority) would then be that Strava is dominant. A possible reason could be that it controls access 
to an "essential facility" (i.e. it has exclusive access to unique data that is indispensable to become 
active in the market) or because of other unsurmountable entry barriers. As we will discuss below, it 
tends to be quite hard for a competition authority to prove that an incumbent's data is an essential 
facility. However, we are not aware of any current or past cases in which (access to) data has been 
labelled as essential. The following sub-section argues that in the example of Strava, there does 
not appear to be an essential facility. In general, though, competition authorities can still assess the 
role of data in competition problems.  
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7.2.4 Are there bottlenecks for accessing indispensable data? 
There might be bottlenecks for accessing indispensable data, in particular if the data in question is 
unique and there is only one way of obtaining it; for instance, when the data cannot be obtained 
without legal privilege, or because data collection requires large (sunk) investments. Examples of 
the former case include health data and smart meter data (see textbox below). We are not aware of 
examples of the latter case. Thus, only under exceptional circumstances can (access to) data be 
regarded as an essential facility. What is more likely to happen is that a combination of data, 
algorithms, consumer switching costs, network effects, and so on, provides a competitive 
advantage and possibly market power (which is not the same as saying that such a combination 
gives rise to an unsurmountable entry barrier). 
 
Legal bottlenecks for accessing indispensable data 
An example of essential data is provided by smart meters for energy consumption197. In some countries 
(e.g. the Netherlands), distribution system operators have a legal monopoly to connect households to the 
energy grid and install smart metering equipment in households' premises. Thus, they have direct access 
to a range of a household's energy data. EU regulation, however, provides in limited access to energy 
consumption data. This gives outsiders the possibility to offer households a smart thermostat that receives 
data from the smart meter. Based on that, such a company can provide energy savings services. 
 
Another sector with strict requirements about data is health care. These restrictions also provide data 
holders with privileged or restricted access to data. Health care organizations and vendors supplying 
software to them can, thanks to the involvement with patients, collect, generate and control unique data. 
They have to power to decide if and under which conditions they share data with others198. Complementary 
legislations, such as provided by the GDPR, may empower consumers to get access to such data, or to 
give their consent so that other parties can use their data. 
 
Let us come back to the example of Strava. Shortly after Relive had introduced a social networking 
functionality, Strava denied Relive access to its API. Here it is relevant to observe that Strava's API 
agreement says that partners "... may not create an application that merely replicates or competes 
with Strava"199. It also states that “... Strava may currently or in the future develop products and 
services that may be similar to or compete with your Developer Applications”200. Hence, Strava may 
initially provide a certain developer with access to its data, then copy the partner's functionality, 
after which it reserves the right to block access to the data201. 
 
Regarding the question we are addressing here, it is important to note that Strava's blocking of API 
access did not impose a fatal injury on Relive. Relive relied partly on Strava for access to location 
data, but Relive’s customers can also connect the app directly with a wide range of tracking 
devices, such as those manufactured by Suunto, Polar, Apple, Garmin and Adidas202. The blocking 
of data access may also not be fatal for Relive’s social networking functionalities, as Relive can 
probably rely on other sources, such as Facebook, for accessing users’ social data. More generally, 
social graph data can be accessed through sources like email directories, phone address books, 
and social logins offered by various platforms (besides Facebook also including Google and 
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198  Savage et al. (2019). 
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200  https://www.strava.com/legal/api, §11.B (accessed 10 June 2020). 
201  This happened to "Segment Challenge"; see https://webbindustries.com/hackernews/story/20421625. 








LinkedIn). The latter type of options allows for communicating with friends (i.e. share streams and 
updates). 
 
Nevertheless, another app developer that was cut off from data access by Strava, Segment 
Challenge, was fully dependent on Strava's API203 and was shut down soon after Strava cut off its 
data supply.204 Having said that, even with such a dramatic outcome, the data in question need not 
be essential or non-replicable, as illustrated by Relive's strategy to rely on a wide range of data 
sources.  
 
More generally, it may be hard to prove that (access to) an incumbent's data is essential. 
Competition authorities can, however, include data in assessments of competition problems. For 
example, suppose that Strava blocking Relive (a relatively popular app used by about 5%-10% of 
Strava users, as can be observed from company websites) did not drive users away from Strava. 
This would serve as an indication of a dominant position for Strava. The next question is then if this 
behaviour is anti-competitive in the sense that it allows the dominant platform to avoid competition 
on the merits. Strava’s API agreement, which restricts data access to developers offering similar or 
competing services, suggests that this is the objective of the behaviour. 
 
7.2.5 What is the impact of mandatory data sharing on innovation incentives? 
Preventing exclusion by imposing a general obligation on platforms to vertically share data may be 
excessive. First, platforms typically have an incentive to share data with vertical players to enrich 
the services offered on the platform. Second, a general obligation to vertically share data may 
reduce the incentives of downstream players to innovate and find new ways around the upstream 
platform or diversify their data sources.  
 
An obligation to share may be desirable if a platform does not share (exclusive, unique) data in 
order to keep out (potential) competitors (cf. the data sharing obligations for banks, electricity 
companies and health providers). In that case, the primary objective of the sharing obligation is to 
stimulate horizontal competition that would otherwise not arise. In this type of situation, one must 
however be aware of negative impacts on competition that may occur in response to such 
obligations. In particular, note that data sharing requires certain standards and data formats. This 
pushes the type of innovation that obligations engender in the direction of ideas based on the data 
types in question and on the forms in which they can be accessed. By implication, competitors 
experience less drive to aim at more radical innovations that could replace the incumbent, or that 
are based on other types of (elsewhere available) data. The result could be less diversity in 
functionalities, due to the limits of the selected data protocols and standards, and also to 
interference with business models that go beyond innovations that require data access205. The 
relevance of this type of argument will apply to the market in question, including, for instance, the 
rate of technological change and innovation in business models. 
 
When platforms already vertically share data with complementary downstream players (like Strava), 
there may be reasons to impose non-discrimination obligations. The primary objective of such non-
discrimination obligations is to prevent anti-competitive behaviour towards downstream services 
that threaten to (dis)intermediate the platform or threaten to evolve into a horizontal competitor. In 
the case of Strava and Relive, for example, a non-discrimination obligation would have prevented 
Strava from blocking Relive’s data access.  
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A relevant question is whether data sharing obligations or non-discrimination obligations reduce the 
incentives to invest in data. The answer depends on the type of platform and the nature of the data 
in question.  
 
For observed and provided social, contextual, or profile data, it is unlikely that (non-discriminatory) 
data sharing obligations undermine the incentives to collect such data because they are typically 
gathered while providing the service (financial information is gathered while offering banking 
services, data on electricity consumption is gathered while supplying electricity, health data is 
gathered while treating people, and social data is observed while providing social media 
services)206. These data are often shared voluntarily with companies offering complementary 
downstream services, but even when downstream partners evolve into horizontal competitors, 
sharing the data most likely does not affect the incentives to collect them. In our illustration, an 
obligation to share location and social data with a potential competitor like Relive would not harm 
Strava’s incentives to collect these data. These data are a by-product of Strava’s core functionality. 
 
In cases involving derived or inferred data, the impact on the incentives to produce the data may be 
different, but it depends on how the data is employed by both parties. For example, inferred or 
derived social and profile data may contain deeper insights into individual preferences. This makes 
them highly valuable for targeting consumers, which is particularly relevant for platforms that 
monetise consumer attention through selling advertising space. Sharing derived data undermines 
its exclusivity and may invite free riding by others. The risk of freeriding is less with vertical partners 
whose value materialises within a platform’s ecosystem, so that the platform can capture some of 
that value through its pricing. The risk of freeriding is more pertinent when inferred or derived data 
must be shared with horizontal competitors (including vertical partners that evolve into horizontal 
competitors). That may reduce the potential for revenue generation, so that mandatory sharing 
could harm the willingness to invest. It follows that discriminatory access to inferred and derived 
data may be based on an objective reason that it harms the upstream platform’s incentives to invest 
in the production of the data.  
 
In the example of Strava and Relive, an obligation for Strava to share observed and provided 
location and social data, would not have affected its incentives to collect these data. If the data 
concerned derived or inferred data, there might have been objective reasons for Strava to restrict 
data access to partners offering apps similar to or competing with Strava.  
 
7.2.6 What are the options under current legislation (general and sector-specific) to make data sharing 
mandatory? 
At present, there are little options to make data sharing mandatory under competition law. The 
burden of proof to establish dominance and/or apply the essential facilities doctrine is very high 
while it takes a long time to build a case and reach a verdict. By that time, the damage may already 
be done and may be irreversible (see also Van Gorp and De Bijl, 2019).  
 
It helps competition authorities when a vertically integrated platform applies for approval of a 
merger or acquisition. In such cases, competition authorities have an escape, because remedies 
can be imposed as conditions for approval. For instance, a remedy may consist of an obligation to 
the provide non-discriminatory access to data. ACM has already pioneered data sharing as a 
remedy in the Phase II review of such a case. In the Dutch market for educational materials 
publishing, the competition authority conditionally cleared the acquisition of Iddink Group by 
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Sanoma Learning207. Iddink Group owns the learning management app Magister, which is used by 
secondary schools. Sanoma Learning owns publisher of educational materials Malmberg. The 
remedy included conditions to facilitate access for Malmberg’s competitors to Magister, under equal 
conditions and in the same way as Malmberg can access it. Furthermore, Sanoma had to ensure 
that commercially sensitive information of competing publishers cannot find its way to the company 
through Iddink. 
 
7.2.7 Policy options 
Van Gorp and De Bijl (2019) analyse vertical discrimination by digital platforms. In general, 
discrimination by vertically integrated digital platforms should be frowned upon, but there may be 
objective reasons for such behaviour. They discuss the main options for prohibiting discriminatory 
behaviour, based either on a new ex ante rules or on ex post interventions within competition law, 
the latter one complemented with specific guidelines on inferring dominance from observed 
behaviour. We briefly summarise their findings. 
 
In case of ex ante options, discrimination is not allowed unless a platform can convince the 
competition authority that it as objective reasons for it. An objective reason could be that 
discrimination of data access is necessary for maximising downstream innovation while preventing 
freeriding and reverse engineering. One can apply such rules to all vertically integrated platforms, 
or only to platforms with a (dominant) gatekeeper position. The first option seems more effective in 
mitigating the risk of irreversible harm as it would considerably speed up the decision-making by 
competition authorities. In both cases, however, there may be harm when objective reasons to 
discriminate turn out to be valid. For example, when a platform must share its behavioural data until 
it has successfully proven the risk of reverse engineering, the damage may already be done.  
 
Under ex post intervention, discrimination is allowed unless someone files a complaint and the 
platform fails to provide objective reasons for its behaviour. Since only dominant firms can harm 
competition through discrimination, this approach only relates to dominant platforms. While 
establishing that a firm is dominant can be complicated, here dominance can be inferred from the 
occurrence of discrimination by a vertically integrated platform that does not have objective reasons 
for it. Only when an efficiency defence is valid, it becomes necessary to define the relevant market 
and assess dominance, namely to weigh the efficiency gains against possible harm to competition. 
This ex post approach speeds up competition cases, mitigates the risk of irreversible harm, and 
reinstalls the deterrent effect of competition law on exclusionary abuse. Contrary to ex ante rules, 
the ex post approach does not slow down or harm innovations, as platforms can initiate efficiency 
enhancing discriminatory practices without having to wait for permission.  
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